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By 2030, many Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
1
This  study provides  comparative perspectives on the current and prospective situation of 
financial market development in ASEAN, the PRC,  and India, identifies  key priorities for 
strengthening financial infrastructure to promote financial development and regional integration, 
and produces policy recommendations at the national, sub-regional and regional levels. The 
four priority areas covered by the study are: market development, opening,  and efficiency; 
financial inclusion; achievement of financial stability; and financial integration. 
, People's Republic of China 
(PRC), and India (ACI) economies are expected to achieve developed economy status, and this 
will require a substantial contribution from the financial sector. The financial sector  plays a 
number of key roles in the process of economic development and growth, including facilitating 
the trading of goods and services; evaluating investment projects; mobilizing and pooling 
savings to fund projects; transferring funds to where they are needed; monitoring the activities 
of capital users; distributing and monitoring risk; and providing investors with diverse savings 
products. However, in contrast to the high levels of manufacturing productivity in the region, 
development of the financial sector generally has lagged in Asia, largely due to heavy 
regulation, and, in some cases, insufficient scale. Of course, the process of innovation must be 
carefully managed, as experience shows that financial innovation can increase risks as well. 
Financial inclusion needs to be broadened, and financial stability strengthened. Finally, in view 
of the fragmented state of Asian financial markets, many of which lack economies of scale, 
financial integration can contribute to promoting economic development by reducing costs to 
borrowers and investors and increasing competition.  
 
JEL Classification: E52, F32, G21, G22, G24, G28 
                                                 
1 ASEAN includes Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
By 2030, many ACI
2
The financial sector must grow and adapt with the changing needs of Asian economies as they 
develop. In particular, as many ACI economies move toward developed economy status by 
2030, higher levels of economic activity and increased financial wealth will call for increasing 
sophistication of the financial system in terms  of products and services provided. Massive 
investment requirements to support growth will require innovations in financing. However, in 
contrast to the high levels manufacturing productivity in the region, development of the financial 
sector generally has  lagged in Asia, largely due to heavy regulation, and, in some cases, 
insufficient scale. Of course, the process of innovation must be carefully managed, as 
experience shows that financial innovation can increase risks as well. Finally, in view of the 
fragmented state of Asian financial markets, many of which lack economies of scale, financial 
integration can contribute to promoting economic development by reducing costs to borrowers 
and investors and increasing competition.  
 economies are expected to achieve developed economy status, and this 
will require a substantial contribution from the financial sector. The financial sector plays a 
number of key roles in the process of economic development and growth, including facilitating 
the trading of goods and services; evaluating investment projects; mobilizing and pooling 
savings to fund projects; transferring funds to where they are needed; monitoring the activities 
of capital users; distributing and monitoring risk; and providing investors with diverse savings 
products. It is no exaggeration to say that the financial sector is the lifeblood of the economic 
system, and that developing a financial infrastructure capable of supporting sustainable long-
term growth in the region is a critical requirement. Moreover, a malfunctioning financial system 
can have negative consequences for the real economy, so safeguarding financial stability from 
both external and internal risks is a key policy responsibility. This lesson has been repeatedly 
brought home as a result of recent major financial crises.  
The financial sector in Asia has generally performed well in supporting the growth process, as 
shown by Asia’s unmatched growth record. Nonetheless, maintaining a strong growth path and 
meeting the needs of savers and investors in the next two decades will provide many new 
challenges to Asia’s financial sector. These include the need to promote financial inclusion, to 
accommodate the aging of Asian populations, and to support green growth. The study aims to 
provide comparative perspectives on the current and prospective situation of financial market 
development in ASEAN, the PRC, and India, identify the key priorities for strengthening financial 
infrastructure to promote financial development and regional integration, and produce policy 
recommendations at the national, sub-regional and regional levels. The four priority areas 
covered by the study are: market development, opening and efficiency; financial inclusion; 
financial stability; and financial integration. Regarding financial integration, the process 
envisaged for the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2015 can provide a model for wider 
regional integration by 2030. Measures and issues covered in this report include: 
1.  evaluating the current situation of broad indicators of financial market development, 
openness, and efficiency in ASEAN, the PRC and India; 
2.  deepening financial markets, including: development of infrastructure for derivatives, 
foreign exchange and swap transactions; harmonization of regulatory and tax frameworks; 
strengthening of government debt management; development of mechanisms for promoting 
public and private sector financing for infrastructure and other needs; and financial integration; 
                                                 
2 ASEAN, PRC, and India. 
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3.  improving the efficiency of the financial sector, including: payments, clearing and 
settlement; competition policy; and sectoral development issues; 
4.  expanding access to financial services for individuals and micro-, small, and medium-
sized enterprises; 
5.  improving microprudential surveillance and regulation of the financial sector; 
6.  strengthening frameworks for macroprudential policy for financial stability, both at the 
national and regional levels, including: domestic regulatory structures and management of 
capital flows;  
7.  improving exchange rate coordination, including increased regional cooperation; and 
8.   coordinating regional financial institutions with the global financial and monetary system. 
Section 2 describes the overall vision for financial development. Section 3 examines ways to 
promote deepening, opening and increased efficiency of financial markets; Section 4 analyzes 
ways to promote financial inclusion; Section 5 analyzes ways to enhance financial stability; 
Section 6 examines ways to deepen financial integration and Section 7 provides policy 
recommendations at the national, sub-regional and regional levels. 
2.  OVERALL VISION FOR FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
We need a vision for financial development in ASEAN-PRC-India that has to be set within the 
overall vision for economic, social, and environmental development for the region. The Asian 
Development Bank’s recent book on Institutions for Regional Integration sets out the following 
vision for an Asian economic community: 
•  “an integrated market free of restrictions on flows of goods and services; 
•  deeper and more liquid financial markets open to cross-border financial flows, with high 
standards of oversight and strong protection for national and foreign investors; 
•  effective frameworks for coordinating macroeconomic and exchange-rate policies, taking 
into account global challenges and differing national circumstances; 
•  regional forums and dialogues to address vital social issues, such as poverty, exclusion, 
income insecurity, migration, aging, health, and environmental threats; and 
•  a consistent voice to project regional concerns in global policy forums and enhance 
responsible global governance.” (ADB 2011a: 201) 
Notably, four out of the five points touch on financial sector aspects, including liberalization of 
trade in financial services, financial reform and regulation, regulation of capital flows, and reform 
of the international monetary system, including the governance of international financial 
institutions. Table 1 lays out some suggested priorities and policy measures from the report for 
the financial sector. ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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Table 1: Priorities and Policy Measures for the Financial Sector 
Priorities  Policy measures 
  Increase resilience against 
financial crises 
  Improve financial market surveillance 
  Develop larger, deeper regional 
financial markets 
  Promote the harmonization of 
standards and mutual recognition of 
regulations 
  Improve returns for investors and 
reduce capital costs to firms by 
strengthening the regional 
intermediation of savings 
  Strengthen local-currency bond 
markets and their infrastructure 
    Liberalize capital accounts and cross-
border financial services in a prudent 
manner 
Source: ADB (2010:206)   
 
For ACI, the overall vision for financial development should include the following four main 
points: 
i.  deepening, opening, and increased efficiency of financial markets; 
ii.  expansion of access to financial services, i.e., financial inclusion; 
iii.  enhanced financial stability; and 
iv.  deeper financial integration. 
If these factors are promoted effectively, this should result in a sharply expanded share of the 
ACI financial sector in the global financial market. Table 2 shows our projections of the share of 
ACI in the world total in 2030 for four asset classes: bank deposits; credit to the private sector 
by banks; stocks; and private sector local currency bonds. For all categories, the global shares 
are expected to grow dramatically by 2030, with those for bank deposits reaching over 40% of 
the world total, and those for private credit by deposit money banks and stocks to reach about 
one-third of the global total. The share of private bonds starts from a much lower base, but is 
expected to increase over three-fold by 2030 as a result of measures aimed at promoting the 
development of local currency bond markets in the region. The rise of the ACI share reflects 
both the expected increase of the ACI share in global gross domestic product (GDP) and 
projected increases in the ratio of financial assets to GDP in some countries, especially India, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam. By far the biggest contribution to the rise in 
the overall ACI share comes from the PRC, followed by India. ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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Table 2: Development of ACI Financial Assets 
2010 2030 2010 2030
Bank deposits
  ACI 13,390 53,768 23.7 44.1
    ASEAN 1,339 4,194 2.4 3.4
    PRC 10,945 42,332 19.4 34.7
    India 1,106 7,243 2.0 5.9
Private credit by deposit money banks
  ACI 8,278 32,998 16.7 32.9
    ASEAN 966 3,023 1.9 3.0
    PRC 6,679 25,831 13.4 25.8
    India 633 4,144 1.3 4.1
Stock market capitalization
  ACI 10,686 42,442 19.4 34.4
    ASEAN 1,596 5,071 2.9 4.1
    PRC 7,474 28,907 13.6 23.4
    India 1,616 8,464 2.9 6.9
Private bond market capitalization
  ACI 2,162 17,203 4.1 13.7
    ASEAN 348 1,704 0.7 1.4
    PRC 1,663 12,866 3.2 10.2
    India 151 2,632 0.3 2.1
Source: CEIC Database Company, IMF IFS database, BIS Quarterly Review,
World Federation of Exchanges, available at: http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/annual/
2011/equity-markets/domestic-market-capitalization (accessed 8 August 2011),
authors' estimates.
             2010 US$ bn Share of world total, %
 
3.  PROMOTING FINANCIAL DEEPENING, OPENING, AND 
EFFICIENCY 
This section describes the current situation of financial development in the ACI region, and 
measures to promote further financial deepening, opening, and increased efficiency. 
3.1  Current situation of financial development, openness, and 
efficiency  
The nature and progress of Asian financial market deepening in the past decade can be 
analyzed using a methodology similar to that of the World Bank’s Financial Development and 
Structure Database (Lee 2008; Capannelli, Lee, and Petri 2009). Asia's progress in financial 
deepening can be compared with other countries' using the indicators provided in Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt (2009) for four income levels: high, upper middle, lower middle, and low. 
Indicators of financial size, efficiency, and internationalization present a clear picture of progress 
in Asia.  
Financial Size 
Available indicators of financial size all suggest steady progress in ACI economies (Table 3). 
These indicators are central bank assets, bank deposits, deposit money bank assets, liquid 
liabilities (cash plus demand deposits and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and other financial 
institutions), private credit by deposit money banks, stock market capitalization, and private ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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bond market capitalization (all computed as a ratio to nominal GDP). Typically, the ratio of 
central bank assets to GDP falls as income rises, while the all other measures rise. Private bond 
market capitalization is used because it is highly correlated with income levels, while public 
bond market capitalization shows almost no correlation with income levels. 
Table 3: Measures of Financial Sector Size 
  Median ratio by income class 2007  ASEAN  PRC  India  ACI 
    Upper  Lower                   
Ratio to GDP  High  Middle  Middle  Low  2000  2009  2000  2009  2000  2009  2000  2009 
Central bank 
assets 
0.01  0.01  0.04  0.02  0.08  0.03  0.02   0.05   0.08   0.02   0.07   0.03  
Bank deposits  0.87  0.43  0.39  0.20  0.73   0.83   1.04   1.47   0.42   0.64   0.73   0.89  
Deposit money 
bank assets 
1.14  0.55  0.31  0.15  0.85   0.78   1.13   1.07   0.41   0.65   0.83   0.80  
Liquid liabilities  0.90  0.45  0.43  0.27  N.A.  1.05   N.A.  1.57   N.A.  0.75   N.A.  1.08  
Private credit by 
deposit money 
banks 
1.01  0.47  0.31  0.14  0.70   0.77   1.06   1.10   0.26   0.47   0.69   0.77  
Stock market 
capitalization 




0.36  0.16  0.03  0.00  0.13   0.17   0.07   0.19   0.00   0.05   0.10   0.15  
*Simple average 
GDP= Gross Domestic Product 
Sources: Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009) and authors’ estimates. 
Table 3 compares the values for ASEAN, the PRC, India and all of ACI in 2000 and 2009 with 
the median values by income group of the worldwide sample for 2007 (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 
2009). Data for ACI are simple averages of the ratios for the PRC; India; Indonesia; Malaysia; 
the Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; and Viet Nam. Except for central bank assets, all of the 
indicators rise significantly and monotonically with regard to GDP level. 
Table 2 shows that ACI countries on average are, if anything, over-endowed relative to the 
average of high income countries in terms of liquidity and banking sector size, and somewhat 
lower than high income countries in terms of deposit money bank assets, private credit by 
deposit money banks, and stock market capitalization. The PRC tends to score highest on these 
measures, with ASEAN in the middle and India lowest, with India ranging between the medians 
for high income and upper middle income countries. However, they are still lagging in terms of 
private bond market capitalization. Although central bank asset ratios have fallen as expected, 
they are still consistent with the level of lower middle income countries. In contrast, bank 
deposits, deposit money bank assets, and liquid liabilities rose significantly over the period. This 
is rather remarkable, given the diversity of financial conditions in Asia. Private credit extended 
by deposit money banks is somewhat lower than the high income median, mainly due to low 
values for India, Indonesia, and the Philippines. 
Data on financial markets are mixed. For ACI as a whole, stock market capitalization rose from 
.73 times GDP in 2000 to 0.82 in 2009. This reflected big increases in this ratio in the PRC and 
India, which offset declines in ASEAN as a result of the global financial crisis. On the other 
hand, private bond market capitalization clearly lags behind with a ratio of only 0.15 times GDP, ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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in line with the median for upper middle income countries. In summary, ACI has large banking 
sectors and stock markets, but bond markets, especially private sector bonds, are less 
developed by comparison. 
Table 4 shows, as percent of GDP, the three main categories of private sector liabilities and 
total private liabilities for individual countries in 2000 and 2009. All ACI countries showed 
substantial increases in total private liabilities relative to GDP, especially in the PRC, India, and 
Viet Nam. Patterns by liability category were mixed. Private bank credit fell in Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998. Stock 
market capitalization rose in all ACI countries, while private bond market capitalization fell only 
in Singapore. However, among ACI countries, private bond market capitalization is high only in 
Malaysia, which underlines the scope for further development of this sector. 
Table 4: Sources of Private Sector Funding as % of GDP 
% of GDP
2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009
ASEAN* 70.4 76.9 72.4 76.2 12.6 16.9 141.3 167.1
Indonesia 17.8 24.0 16.3 33.0 1.4 1.5 35.5 58.6
Malaysia 123.1 113.2 124.7 132.6 32.9 49.6 280.7 295.3
Philippines 38.2 29.9 32.0 47.6 0.2 1.0 70.5 78.5
Singapore 96.7 102.2 164.8 169.5 16.9 13.2 278.5 284.9
Thailand 116.3 95.2 24.0 52.4 11.8 19.1 152.0 166.8
Viet Nam 30.4 96.7 --   21.8 --   --   30.4 118.6
PRC 106.4 110.0 48.5 100.3 7.0 19.0 161.9 229.4
India 26.4 46.5 32.2 85.4 0.5 4.6 59.1 136.6
ACI* 69.4 77.2 63.2 80.3 10.1 15.4 133.6 171.1
Others
Hong Kong, China 150.9 152.4 364.4 1088.6 17.2 14.2 532.5 1255.2
Japan 195.3 107.2 67.6 67.1 47.4 37.8 310.4 212.1










Notes: GDP= Gross Domestic Product; PRC= People’s Republic of China; —= data not available; 
* Unweighted averages; data for other ASEAN countries not available. 
Sources: IFS Feb 2011 CD, CEIC Data Company, available at: http://www.ceicdata.com,  
(accessed 12 April 2011), BIS Quarterly Review Jul 2012, WDI. 
Life insurance premiums as a percentage of GDP tend to grow with per capital income. 
(Premiums are shown, as data on assets are not available for most economies.) Table 5 shows 
very high levels for Hong Kong, China; and Singapore, as befits their status as international 
financial centers. Malaysia’s level is relatively high at 6.3% of GDP. If one takes the Republic of 
Korea’s (henceforth, Korea) level of 4.5% of GDP as a longer-term benchmark for development, 
then countries such as the PRC and Thailand are relatively close, while India, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Viet Nam have further to go.  ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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Table 5: Insurance and mutual fund industry development 
% of GDP 2000 2010 2000 2010
ASEAN* 4.7 4.8 47.5 106.8
Indonesia** 1.0 1.6 0.4 2.3
Malaysia --   6.3 12.2 49.3
Philippines** 1.3 1.0 --   1.1
Singapore 14.1 14.2 169.8 461.1
Thailand 2.5 4.2 7.7 20.1
Viet Nam+ --   1.4 --   --  
PRC 1.6 3.7 0.9 6.2
India --   2.3 6.4 8.5
ACI* 4.2 4.4 35.0 81.9
Others
Hong Kong, China** 32.9 88.2 184.1 442.9
Korea 5.5 4.5 17.7 20.9
Total Insurance Premiums Mutual Fund Assets
 
 Notes: *Unweighted averages. Instead of 2010 data, ** denotes 2009 and + denotes 2008;  
-- denotes not available; data for other ASEAN countries not available. 
Source: CEIC database, available at: http://www.ceicdata.com, (accessed 1 August 2011). 
The asset management industry is expected to grow rapidly as a result of rising incomes, high 
savings rates, and the ageing of populations in most economies. Table 4 shows that the share 
of assets under management in GDP tends to rise with per capita income, although the spread 
is relatively wide. Hong Kong, China; and Singapore have very high shares of assets under 
management in GDP, befitting their roles as international financial centers. Aside from these, 
Malaysia has the highest share in the region by far, followed by Thailand and Korea, which have 
shares of around 20% of GDP. This suggests that this ratio will rise toward at least 20% of GDP 
in countries such as the PRC and India as they develop further. 
Financial Openness 
Along with economic and financial development, financial systems tend to become more open 
as well, i.e., restrictions on capital accounts tend to be eased. However, capital account regimes 
can become more restrictive as well, particularly if countries experience shocks from episodes 
of rapid capital inflows or outflows. A certain level of capital market openness is a prerequisite 
for regional financial integration, which is discussed in Section 6 below.  
Financial openness is not easy to measure, and there are two broad approaches to doing so—
de jure  and  de facto. De jure measures assess the restrictiveness of published laws and 
regulations regarding foreign exchange and capital account transactions. These are typically 
based on the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) (IMF 2008). Examples of this approach include Quinn 
(2003) and the Chinn-Ito Index (Chinn and Ito 2008). The Chinn-Ito Index is  compiled  by 
evaluating four major categories of restrictions on external accounts: (i) the presence of a 
multiple exchange rate regime, (ii) the presence of restrictions on current account transactions, 
(iii) the presence of restrictions  on capital account transactions, and (iv) the presence of a 
requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. The index score ranges from -2.5 (fully closed) 
to +2.5 (fully open).  
Figure 1 shows the values for the Chinn-Ito Index for major ACI economies plus Hong Kong, 
China in 1996 and 2009. The data show both a wide range and substantial changes over the 
period in both directions. Hong Kong, China; and Singapore are rated as fully open, consistent ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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with their status as regional financial centers, while both the PRC and India have maintained 
relatively low ratings of -1.15, i.e., relatively closed.  Indonesia and Viet Nam have become 
significantly more open, while Malaysia and Thailand have become less open, primarily as a 
result of their experiences during the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998. This scoring suggests 
three broad categories: open; moderately open; and relatively closed. 
Figure 1: Chinn-Ito Indices for Major ACI Economies 












Source: Chinn-Ito (2008). 
However, it is widely recognized that de jure measures may not reliably capture the effective 
degree of capital market openness, since application and enforcement of rules may vary widely, 
and details of regulations not captured in the index may have significant implications for market 
openness. For example, as is discussed below, both the PRC and India regulate inflows by 
foreign institutional investors, but the PRC has established strict quotas, while India has no 
quotas.  
The alternative approach is to measure the de facto capital market openness based on 
estimates of actual capital flows. One of the main sources in this regard is Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2006), who estimated ratios to GDP of gross external assets and liabilities for 145 
countries for 1970–2004. The essential idea was that a higher level of external assets and 
liabilities (relative to GDP or some other measure) indicated the effective openness of capital 
markets. However, there are many difficulties with this approach. First, their data included 
official reserves, which reflect official currency policy, and hence do not necessarily say much 
about capital market openness. Second, being a stock, the measure tends to rise over time, 
even though the actual degree of openness may not have changed. Third, the appropriate 
normalizing variable is unclear, since using either nominal GDP or total trade can introduce 
various biases and distortions depending on the openness of the economy to trade and other 
factors. Finally, the series has not been updated beyond 2004. 
Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009) examined a number of globalization indicators, including, the 
ratio to GDP of: international debt securities outstanding; net issuance of international debt ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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securities, loans from non-resident banks, and remittances; and the ratio of offshore deposits to 
bank deposits. However, only the level of outstanding international debt securities showed a 
clear and consistent correlation with income levels. Figure 2 shows the ratio of international debt 
securities to GDP for the major ACI countries.  
Figure 2: Ratio of International Debt Securities to GDP 
Ratio to GDP, %
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
  PRC
    Viet Nam
    Thailand
  India
    Indonesia
    Malaysia
    Philippines
    Singapore
  Hong Kong, China
2000 2010
 
Source: BIS Quarterly Review, June 2011, CEIC Database Co. Available at www.ceic.com (accessed 9 September 2011). 
The distribution of values is similar to that of the Chinn-Ito de jure index, with Hong Kong, China; 
and Singapore being the most open and India, Thailand, and the PRC being relatively closed. 
Thailand clearly became more closed since the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, and the 
Philippines and Malaysia showed a similar tendency, although more muted. Viet Nam scores as 
less open on this measure than the de jure measure, suggesting that the de jure measures may 
not adequately capture the effective restrictions on issuance activity. 
Financial Efficiency 
The measures of financial sector efficiency shown in Table 6 (net interest margin, cost to 
income ratio, loan to deposit ratio, return on assets, and return on equity) are not as closely 
correlated with income levels as the size measures in Table 3. As in Table 3, Table 6 shows the 
median values for the four income groups in 2007, and the comparable average data for the 
three subregions of ACI and the total in 2001 and 2008.
3
                                                 
3 Data for 2000 are not available. 
  While the first three measures 
generally rise with income, there is little or no change in the net interest margin or cost-to-
income ratios. The ratios for returns on assets and equity are actually highest in low income 
countries; the increased competition and capital deepening that accompany higher income 
levels presumably helps to drive them down. ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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Table 6: Measures of Financial Sector Efficiency and Integration 
Upper Lower
High Middle Middle Low 2001 2008
Net interest margin 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.03
Cost to income ratio 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.50 0.74 0.56
Loan to deposit ratio 1.00 0.80 0.85 0.60 0.93 0.85
Return on assets (%) 1.50 1.90 1.60 2.00 0.84 1.38
Return on equity (%) 16.0 15.0 15.0 21.0 15.3 -3.8
bonds/GDP 0.41 0.19 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.10
Median ratio by income class 2007 ACI*
 
GDP= Gross Domestic Product 
Note: 
*
Source: Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009) and Bankscope database, available at: 
Simple average.  
www.bankscope.com (accessed 7 
March 2010). 
Asian performance in this category is decidedly mixed. In all three subregions, the net interest 
margin changed little over the period, and is still close to that of the low income level. The cost-
to-income and loan-to-deposit ratios mostly fell in 2008, especially in the PRC, close to or in 
some cases lower than the low income level. Of course, the latter proved to be a good thing 
during the financial crisis, as it meant minimal dependence on wholesale sources of funding in 
most countries. Returns on assets and equity improved markedly between 2001 and 2008 in the 
PRC and India, but are still quite low compared with global levels, while that for ASEAN was 
negative in 2008. The generally low level of financial efficiency in 2008 points to the need for 
further financial reform, despite improvements between 2001 and 2008. 
Financial Soundness and Governance Measures 
Great strides have been made in improving financial soundness since the 1997–1998 Asian 
crisis. Capital adequacy ratios actually fell on average somewhat between 2000 and 2009, but 
were at high levels. On the other hand, nonperforming loans (NPLs) in the region fell 
dramatically from an unweighted average of 14.1% of total loans in 2000 to only 3.4% in 2009 
(Table 7), with all countries showing marked improvement. Especially dramatic improvements 
were seen in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. While much of this 
improvement could be attributed to sustained economic expansion since 2000, structural 
improvements played a role as well. ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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Table 7: Measures of Financial Stability and Governance 
Country 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009
ASEAN* 16.4 15.6 14.4 4.0 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1
Indonesia 21.6 17.5 18.8 3.8 -0.3 -0.3 -0.8 -0.6
Malaysia 12.5 14.6 15.4 3.8 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5
Philippines 16.2 15.8 16.6 4.6 0.1 0.0 -0.5 -0.5
Singapore 19.6 16.5 3.4 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.4 1.6
Thailand** 11.9 13.8 17.7 5.7 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.0
Viet Nam --   --   --   --   -0.7 -0.6 -0.4 -0.4
PRC 13.5 10.0 --   1.6 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.3
India 11.1 13.2 12.7 2.4 -0.1 -0.3 0.2 0.0
ACI* 15.3 14.6 14.1 3.5 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
Others
Hong Kong, China 17.8 16.6 6.1 1.5 1.7 1.8 0.9 1.5
Korea 10.5 14.2 6.6 1.5 0.6 0.0 1.4 0.0
Taipei,China** --   11.4 --   1.2 --   1.1 --   0.8
Capital adequacy







Note: * Unweighted average; ** 2008 data instead of 2009; +Scale from -2.5 to +2.5. 
Sources: IMF Global Financial Stability Report, Apr 2010; 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project website 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (accessed 15 April 2011). 
Qualitative measures of governance and regulatory efficiency have shown much less evidence 
of progress. For example, for ACI as a whole, the World Bank’s indices for Regulatory Quality 
and Rule of Law (from its survey of World Governance Indicators) were both stable between 
2000 and 2009. Improvements in some countries were partly offset by deterioration in Thailand 
and India.  
3.2  Ways to promote financial deepening and opening 
Banks have been the workhorse of the Asian economic growth model, partly because they 
could be influenced by policymakers to lend in line with development policy objectives, and 
partly because they could develop long-term relationships with borrowers and thereby exercise 
effective oversight. However, the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 highlighted problems of 
inadequate bank governance and regulation. This led both to an overhaul of banking sectors 
and to a recognition of the need to develop bond markets as a “spare tire” for financing during 
times of crisis. Numerous initiatives have been undertaken to promote bond market 
development, including the Asian Bond Fund Initiative (ABMI) and Asian Bond Funds (ABF), but 
further work needs to be done in this area for Asian bond markets to achieve their potential, 
particularly with regard to corporate bonds. Progress in this area can be achieved in a number 
of dimensions, including improving the infrastructure related to securities and foreign exchange 
(FX) markets; promoting coverage by credit rating agencies; developing mechanisms to support 
infrastructure financing, etc.; strengthening government debt management; enhancing the ABMI 
and ABF programs; improving financial operating efficiency, including payment systems, 
clearing and settlement; and addressing sectoral competition issues. ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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Infrastructure related to securities and fx markets 
Batten, Hogan, and Szilagyi (2009) and Spiegel (2009) provide good summaries of steps that 
can be taken to deepen regional bond markets. Globally, the great majority of bonds (88.2%) 
are fixed rate with simple pricing features. Issuers of such bonds will normally require the means 
to hedge the currency risk associated with local currency bond issuance. The long-term viability 
of this segment is thus closely linked to the presence of: (1) highly liquid foreign exchange and 
derivatives markets that facilitate risk management and transformation; (2) regulations that 
facilitate cooperation with market participants; and (3) benchmark issues and competitive pricing 
between markets (Batten, Hogan, and Szilagyi  2009). Governments can improve their debt 
management. Risk-free benchmarks are an integral and necessary requirement for pricing and 
hedging in the corporate bond market. Ultimately, the risk-free government bond provides the 
benchmark for credit spreads. Thus, it is critical to recognize that adequate liquidity must be 
maintained, irrespective of fiscal requirements. 
It is crucial to expand credit rating agencies' coverage of private issues by encouraging regional 
national rating agencies and promoting activities by global rating agencies (Spiegel 2010). 
Global and regional rating agencies have their strengths and weaknesses, but the best strategy 
is likely to be one that encourages additional coverage by both. However, the conflicts of 
interest that have compromised the independence and impartiality of ratings must be 
addressed. Fortunately, Asia already has a large number of national credit rating agencies, as 
shown in Table 8. 




PRC 9 Centrus Credit Rating Co., Ltd., Chengxin International Credit Rating Co., Ltd., China
Lianhe Credit Rating, Co. Ltd., Dagong Global Credit Rating Co., Ltd., Shanghai
Brilliant Credit Rating Co., Ltd., Shanghai Credit Information Services Co., Ltd.,
Shang
India 5 Credit Analysis & Research Ltd (CARE), CRISIL, Ltd., Investment Information and
Credit Rating Agency (ICRA), ONICRA Credit Rating Agency of India, Ltd., SME
Rating Agency of India Limited (SMERA)
Indonesia 2 P.T. Kasnic Credit Rating Indonesia – Indonesia, P.T. PEFINDO Credit Rating
Korea, Rep. of 4 Korea Investors Service, Inc. (KIS), Korea Ratings Corporation, National Information
& Credit Evaluation, Inc. (NICE), Seoul Credit Rating & Information, Inc.
Malaysia 2 Malaysian Rating Corporation Berhad (MARC), RAM Rating Services Berhad (RAM)
Philippines 2 Credit Information Bureau, Inc., Philippine Rating Services, Corp. (PhilRatings)
Thailand 1 Thai Rating and Information Services (TRIS)  
Source: defaultrisk.com (accessed 15 April 2011) 
Financial regulatory and tax systems can be considered as part of market infrastructure. Many 
market imperfections in Asian markets are self-induced. For example, withholding taxes and 
legal constraints combine to segment markets from global capital (Jiang and McCauley 2004) 
and appear to be a major deterrent to investors. Reluctance by some currency authorities to 
permit overseas transactions in their currency is another barrier. Of course, financial 
deregulation entails risks, and needs to be implemented judiciously. A recent ADB study (ADB 
2010) surveyed institutional investors regarding their perceptions of barriers to bond market 
access in Asian economies. The results are summarized in Table 9.  ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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Table 9: Distribution of Perceived Bond-Market-Related Barriers by Country 
Number of survey respondents reporting problems
Problem PRC HKG IND INO MAL PHI SIN THA VIE Total
Lack of derivative instruments 0
Lack of repo operations 1 1 1 1 4 8
Lack of securities lending 2 2
Settlement of FX trades 3 1 4
Local currency borrowing 1 1 2 3 2 2 1 12
FX cash repatriation restrictions 1 1 6 2 3 8 3 24
FX exchange restrictons 2 1 8 4 5 10 4 34
Income payments 1 1
Legal jurisdiction 1 1 2
Taxes 2 6 5 2 2 17
Investor registration 5 3 1 1 1 4 15
Legal system differences 1 1 2
Direct access to local settlement 2 1 1 1 5   
Note: HKG = Hong Kong, China: IND = India; INO = Indonesia; MAL = Malaysia; PHI = Philippines; SIN = Singapore; THA 
= Thailand; and VIE = Viet Nam. 
Source: ADB (2010), author estimates.                
   
Withholding taxes and restrictions on FX convertibility and repatriation were among the barriers 
most frequently mentioned. It is important to note that some of these barriers fall more in the 
province of the public sector (regulations and taxes), while others fall in the province of the 
private sector (settlement procedures, etc.). Therefore, efforts to reduce such barriers must be 
directed to both sectors. Indonesia has the largest number of perceived barriers, followed by 
Thailand, the PRC, and the Philippines. In contrast, Hong Kong, China; Malaysia; and 
Singapore have very low numbers of perceived barriers. 
Mechanisms to support infrastructure financing, etc.   
Asia’s infrastructure investment needs are massive—estimated by ADB/ADBI at US$8 trillion 
between 2010 and 2010 (ADB/ADBI 2009). However, some economies in the region face 
significant fiscal constraints that would not allow them to provide sufficient finance for such 
projects. Fiscal constraints can be relaxed in several ways: increases in overseas development 
assistance (ODA); public funding from regional institutions; and introduction of private capital, 
e.g., via public-private partnerships (PPP). Since large increases in ODA probably cannot be 
expected over current levels, the burden will have to fall on regional public funding and PPPs. 
Regional public funding is discussed below in Section 6.3. 
The core task of structuring a PPP project is to reconcile the interests of various parties from the 
private and public sectors. These parties include investors, lenders, and contractors on the 
private sector side and the government and other entities on the public sector side. One of the 
potential benefits of PPPs is encouraging the public sector to identify project risks and consider 
risk transfer in a way that helps to avoid substantial cost overruns. On the other hand, private-
sector investors and lenders involved in a PPP project have capital at risk, and therefore a 
greater financial incentive to ensure that the service is provided as required in the contract. 
Moreover, lenders may provide benefits through independent due diligence and control of the 
project, because they want to ensure that the project is viable, and that all obligations in a 
contract can be safely fulfilled. 
PPPs, while sounding promising, are complex and costly. (See Nishizawa [2011] for a good 
discussion.) Risk allocations are challenging because of the public nature of infrastructure 
services provision and inherent uncertainties over the long term. There is a perception of PPPs ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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being in favor of “private profit at the public’s expense” . Difficulties also arise from the different 
attitudes of investors, the government and lenders, as well as the general public. PPPs are 
equipped with very commercial and contractual structures and operational modalities, but at the 
same time are extremely political, especially in the implementation stage. 
Strengthen government debt management   
Governments need to improve their debt management to support the liquidity of their bond 
markets. Risk-free benchmarks are an integral and necessary requirement for pricing and 
hedging in the corporate bond market. Ultimately, the risk-free government bond provides the 
benchmark for credit spreads. Thus, it is critical to recognize that adequate liquidity must be 
maintained across a range of maturities, irrespective of fiscal requirements (Batten, Hogan, and 
Szilagyi 2009). 
Improving efficiency: payments, settlement and clearing systems 
Financial systems—either banking or securities markets—cannot function without efficient 
systems for payments, settlement and clearing, as these form the essential “plumbing” of the 
system. These systems generally held up well in Asia during the global financial crisis. 
However, there are many ways that they can be strengthened further. For example, although all 
major ACI countries except Viet Nam have real-time gross settlement (RTGS) payments 
systems, they still need to be substantially upgraded to handle smaller transactions and various 
kinds of risks. 
Competition issues by sector 
Barriers to entry in various financial sectors remain high, both within countries and across 
borders. This leads to higher costs and inefficiencies. In view of the key role of the financial 
sector in allocating savings and investment, this represents a significant constraint on growth 
prospects in Asia.  
Banking: Competition in many banking sectors remains limited by regulations that restrict entry 
of foreign financial institutions into domestic markets. This is evidenced by the low level of entry 
of regional banks in each other’s home markets. Table 10 shows the penetration of foreign 
banks into a number of ACI markets. It shows that the number of ACI-owned foreign banks is 
particularly low in the PRC, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. This needs to be addressed 
as part of the general financial integration measures discussed below. 

















ASEAN 335 94 241 121 120 52 68
   Indonesia 36 10 26 7 19 6 13
   Malaysia 23 9 14 8 6 1 5
   Philippines 38 19 19 10 9 4 5
   Singapore 119 6 113 69 44 18 26
   Thailand 32 12 20 9 11 4 7
   Viet Nam 87 38 49 18 31 19 12
PRC 38 37 1 1 0 0 0
India 75 48 27 14 13 8 5
ACI 448 179 269 136 133 60 73 
*Excluding thrifts. 
Source: Bankscope database, available at: www.bankscope.com (accessed 25 May 2011) ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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In some cases, barriers among subcategories of banks can also contribute to inefficiencies. For 
example, the status of state-owned banks in countries such as the PRC and India, which enjoy 
implicit or explicit government guarantees, can make financing conditions of private banks more 
difficult. Since state-owned banks tend to lend disproportionately to priority sectors targeted by 
the government, this can starve the rest of the economy of adequate funds. 
Insurance: The situation of insurance companies in ACI economies is similar to that of banking, 
i.e., industry entry, especially by foreign insurance companies, is limited, leading to economic 
inefficiency and high costs.  
Asset management:  With the exceptions of Hong Kong, China; the PRC; Malaysia; and 
Singapore, the development of the private asset management sector in ACI economies is still 
limited. In view of the rapid ageing of populations in many ACI countries over the next two 
decades, demand for asset management services is expected to expand rapidly. Cross-border 
competition for such services is even scarcer, due to existing restrictions on capital flows. 
3.3  Relation to government development policy 
Most ACI governments have taken an active approach to economic development policy. In view 
of the key role of the financial sector in allocating resources for investment, this took various 
forms, including direct guidance of bank lending to preferred sectors (often with implicit 
guarantees of such lending), financial repression in order to lower costs of funding for preferred 
sectors, and limits on cross-border capital flows.  Since the general tendency of financial 
development has been to increase the autonomous functioning of markets to raise the efficiency 
of resource allocation, this inevitably raises tensions with the aim of the government to influence 
resource allocation. This raises the question of how to minimize these potential conflicts 
between market functioning and government economic development policy, or, alternatively, 
how to identify ways to achieve a given set of development policies with a maximum degree of 
allocative efficiency. 
There are no easy solutions to this dilemma. The most obvious approach is to eliminate factor 
market distortions to the extent possible, including price subsidies and barriers to entry. Such an 
approach will tend to reduce the collateral economic damage associated with economic 
development policies. This suggests that targeted sectors should be promoted via subsidies for 
entry to specific industries or activities, but that entry itself should not be restricted. However, 
this is a subject beyond the aims of this paper.  
4.  EXPANDING FINANCIAL INCLUSION  
4.1  Increasing access 
Access to financial services remains limited for micro-, small, and medium-sized enterprises 
(MSMEs) and households in many ACI economies. This limits the contribution that these 
sectors can make to growth and may have other undesirable side-effects, such as 
unnecessarily high levels of savings, higher income inequality, and volatility of consumption and 
investment. Expanding access to financial services is thus an important aspect securing more 
equitable and sustainable growth. ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
 
 
  18 
Consumer Finance 
Consumer finance is still relatively undeveloped in most ACI economies. Use of credit cards is 
expanding rapidly, but in some cases from a small base. Access to credit for purchase of 
durables such as automobiles and electrical appliances remains limited. Development of 
consumer data bases can support the expansion of this sector. 
Small and medium-sized enterprise finance 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have been rather neglected because Asian banks 
have focused more on consumer lending, which is less complicated than the SME business. 
Policy measures should be directed at creating an enabling environment for SMEs, by (i) 
developing a corporate credit information database and credit guarantee system at both the 
national and regional levels; and (ii) nurturing entrepreneurship and technological and human 
resource development. Governments need to conceptualize a broader and longer-term blueprint 
for financial sector reform, and align current policy measures to this long-term plan. A better 
balance between enhancing SME lending and ensuring stability (prudential) can be achieved 
through a holistic approach that strengthens supervision and capabilities. 
The rationale for the government's role in facilitating SMEs' access to credit is generally drawn 
from research showing SMEs’ contribution to economic performance and the link between credit 
flow and economic performance. It is widely believed that SMEs play a crucial role in developing 
countries, by helping to alleviate poverty and being an important contributor to innovation and 
sustainable growth. Empirical studies have also shown that credit to the private sector plays a 
key role in economic growth (Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Khan and Senhadji 2000). This 
growth may be due to SME performance, as suggested by studies that explore the link between 
credit flow and SME performance. Utilizing cross-industry and cross-country data, Beck, Levine, 
and Loayza (2000) found that improvements in financial development (as measured by the ratio 
of private credit to GDP) help accelerate the growth of SMEs. It is therefore not surprising that 
many governments have intervened in the financial sector to boost credit flow to SMEs.  
While market failures present a compelling rationale for governments to intervene in finance, 
governments should work with market forces to correct, rather than exacerbate, existing market 
failures. The most important role of government is not to provide finance, but to strengthen the 
institutional underpinnings of financial transactions (ADB 2009). This requires improvements in 
legal, regulatory, and information infrastructure that underpins the efficient operation of financial 
systems. 
For example, governments should consider reforming their subsidy programs to differentiate 
between the financing needs of SMEs due to structural market failure and the normal economic 
cycle. Loan guarantees also need to be reconsidered, and designed in a way that minimizes 
moral hazard and avoids market distortions. A clear exit strategy would also be needed to allow 
authorities to withdraw their support systematically.  
Other measures to improve SME financing include building banks’ capacity in transaction 
technologies, and encouraging innovation so that banks can identify technologies that have a 
comparative advantage in SME environments. The entry of foreign-owned  banks could be 
encouraged, as they are more able to effectively use transaction technologies suited to SMEs.  
Trade finance, both for domestic and international trade, is very important for SMEs, but they 
still tend to face obstacles in financing because of lack of data, collateral, etc. To the extent that 
policies can ease these obstacles, this could make an important contribution to economic 
growth potential by expanding the number of firms able to export and import. They key is to find 
innovative ways to cut transaction costs. ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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Micro Finance 
Micro-finance—the extension of small amounts of credit to a large number of poor households 
and enterprises—has been growing rapidly in a number of countries, although most recently the 
sector has suffered growing pains in India and some other countries. Controversy has focused 
on issues such as whether or not rates charged are usurious and whether overly aggressive 
lending led to increased bankruptcies and, in some cases, suicides. On the other hand, micro-
finance has in many cases been a leader in technological innovation, including use of 
cellphones for bank transactions. 
In most cases, the regulatory frameworks for micro-finance are not well developed, including 
consumer protection and bankruptcy laws, and these need to be addressed. Creation and/or 
improvement of consumer credit databases can also contribute to the healthy development of 
this sector.  
Green finance 
Financing for green growth encompasses a variety of areas, including traditional pollution 
control, investments in alternative energy sources, investments in energy conservation, and 
investments in projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. These can be considered as 
contributing to inclusive finance in the sense that, due to various externalities, traditional 
financing mechanisms do not provide sufficient incentives to lead to socially efficient levels of 
investment in these areas.  
The control of greenhouse gases is particularly complex because the relevant “commons” area 
is the entire planet. Use of institutions such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has 
been an important development in this area to find cost-effective solutions to greenhouse gas 
reductions. This framework allows advanced economies to finance lower-cost greenhouse gas 
reduction projects in developing economies, and thereby gain emission credits, but the process 
still has many limitations. Although these are best addressed in global fora, there may be scope 
for regional agreements for cost-sharing as well. Water pollution and water management are 
often regional issues, as in the case of the Mekong Delta, so international financial transfer 
mechanisms may prove useful in this area as well. 
4.2  Strengthening credit and other databases 
As mentioned above, policies to expand SME finance should aim to increase the availability of 
credit information rather than simply providing subsidies. This can help to ease the problems of 
identifying suitable collateral for lending to SMEs. Consistent and accessible SME financial 
databases should be established. 
4.3  Legal and regulatory infrastructure 
The development of specialized lending institutions for consumers and SMEs may require 
regulatory innovations to cover these institutions and minimize potential financial systemic risk. 
In the case of consumer finance, strengthening of consumer protection laws may be required as 
well, such as improvements in disclosure and prevention of collection abuses. 
5.  ENHANCING FINANCIAL STABILITY 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 and the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 underlined 
the high costs of financial crises in terms of lost output and financial disruption, and highlighted ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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the importance of improving institutions to prevent crises and manage them if they do arise. 
Such an institutional framework provides a key support for sustainable growth. Asian financial 
systems generally performed well during the global financial crisis, partly because they avoided 
large exposures to sophisticated but ultimately toxic financial products. Nevertheless, there are 
still lessons to be learned. At the traditional microprudential level of supervision, the emphasis 
should be on improving regulatory capacity and closing regulatory gaps. The crisis also showed 
the need to identify and manage systemic risks not necessarily observable at the level of the 
individual financial institution, i.e., to implement macroprudential supervision and regulation. 
Again, Asian regulators have in many cases been ahead of the game in this area relative to 
advanced economies, but important further steps can be taken in this area as well. 
5.1  Microprudential policy 
The primary concerns regarding microprudential regulation following the global financial crisis 
have been: (1) banks should hold more capital, as previous buffers have proved inadequate to 
allow banks to recover; (2) banks should also have liquidity buffers so that they can withstand 
the drying up of money markets for a significant period; and (3) banks should not become too 
leveraged in order to lessen the need for drastic asset sales when prices are artificially 
depressed in a crisis. These have all been reflected in the new Basel 3 recommendations 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2010). Clearly, central banks will always be there as 
lenders of last resort to ensure that confidence is maintained in the system as a whole in the 
event of market problems, but the rationale for buffers is to reduce the fragility of the system and 
buy time for solutions to be worked out in the event of difficulty.  
The previous Basel rules encouraged banks to shift problems off their balance sheets, but in 
practice there was still exposure to risk, especially to their reputations if their off-balance-sheet 
vehicles failed, and, hence, one can expect that authorities will be keen to make sure that this 
misleading shifting does not occur in the future. It is important to ensure that the development of 
shadow banking does not obscure overall supervision and regulation of individual institutions. 
Development of regulatory capacity remains an important issue for many Asian economies, as 
regulators struggle to keep up with increasingly liberalized and sophisticated financial sectors.  
This applies both to banks and other financial institutions. 
5.2  Macroprudential policy 
Macroprudential policy aims to reduce financial systemic risk. For emerging economies, such 
risk tends to emanate from three areas: procyclicality, i.e., the tendency for optimism and risk-
taking to build up cumulatively during an expansion and unwind during a downturn; 
interconnectedness of markets and institutions; and external shocks that typically result in 
capital flow reversals. Two major areas need to be addressed. The first is to strengthen the 
financial system so that it can withstand major shocks, both by eliminating having institutions 
whose failure could disrupt the system, and by compelling institutions to put in place plans for 
handling the failure of core service suppliers in a manner that does not disrupt the system. The 
second is to make available discretionary tools that can be used to supplement the automatic 
countercyclical stabilizers mentioned above and standard monetary policy tools to both limit the 
buildup of systemic risk and to reduce the potential for financial sector losses resulting from 
crises. Such tools can take the form of loan-to-value ratios for lending or reserve requirements 
(Kawai 2011). 
The institutional framework for macroprudential management is very important. Adams (2010) 
and Kawai (2011) advocate the establishment of a systemic risk council or systemic stability ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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regulator. Such a council would be of a very high level and would not only be responsible for 
monitoring and coordinating, but also for ensuring that both preemptive and corrective 
macroprudential measures are undertaken by the responsible agencies. While such a council 
could be driven by one of the main agencies, such as the central bank, there are advantages in 
it being independent so that conflicts of interest are reduced. Cho (2010) makes a similar 
proposal, and identifies one of the main tasks of a crisis management team as being “triage”—
there needs to be a common diagnosis and an agreed response, especially regarding 
communication, across all agencies. One advantage of having such a council, rather than 
simply assigning responsibility to the central bank, is that it leaves the central bank free to 
continue to run an independent monetary policy. 
Ways of reducing procyclicality 
Capital adequacy regulations, particularly under Basel 2, can contribute considerably to 
increasing the amplitude of the financial and economic cycle. In rising markets, capital values 
increase and little effort is required to meet capital requirements that are constant through the 
cycle. However, in downturns, not only do losses mean that new capital is required, but capital 
values themselves fall and the cost of raising capital increases. This means that banks may 
have to contract lending in order to preserve adequate capital, thereby adding to the difficulties 
for the real economy at a time when it is already under pressure. In addition, under Basel 2, 
credit ratings, whether internally or externally generated, played an enhanced role in 
determining capital requirements. However, ratings also tend to follow a cyclical path, in part 
because the track record of the rated institution plays an important part in the determination of 
its rating.  Taken together, these factors can amplify the cycle. This was clearly an unintended 
consequence of Basel 2, yet one that had been pointed out for some time before it came into 
effect (Peura and Jokivuolle 2003). 
There are also more basic reasons why the financial system tends to exacerbate cycles in the 
real economy. “Good times“ are likely to lead to a more relaxed attitude to risk (as memories 
fade the longer it has been since people were exposed to a downturn), while herd behavior 
exacerbates swings and encourages overlending. Bonus systems may encourage risk taking in 
the up phase as people make provision for the possibility that they will lose their jobs in the 
contraction. 
Monetary policy already tends to lean against the economic cycle. The simplest response is to 
introduce a countercyclical element into the determination of capital ratios, raising them when 
growth picks up and allowing them to diminish as growth eases. Given that this involves 
increasing capital when it is cheap but not having to do so when it is scarce, this conveys an 
immediate benefit. Such changes can probably be made without the need for new legislation in 
many countries. Basel 3 includes provisions for such buffers, but they do not have an explicit 
form for general implementation at present. Fernández de Lis and Garcia-Herrero (2010) 
describe a different approach, currently employed in Spain and more recently introduced in Peru 
and Colombia, whereby provisioning for bad loans is procyclical. In Spain, whenever lending 
increases more rapidly than normal, provisioning needs to increase more than proportionately 
on the grounds that rapid increases are likely to be accompanied by a decrease in the quality of 
lending. In a downturn, such provisions can then be used as defaults increase, without the need 
to increase capital in such difficult times.  Thus, the provisions reflect the behavior of the 
individual banks. In Peru, the process is related to cyclical fluctuations in GDP and, therefore, 
constitutes a part of macroprudential stability.  
Asian countries have made some use of similar countercyclical provisions in the past. Hong 
Kong, China, for example, has used loan-to-value ratios that become more cautious the faster 
the asset price underpinning the loan increases. Andritzky et al. (2009) suggest a wide range of ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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countercyclical measures that could be applied, in particular taking into account the asymmetric 
problems of liquidity that occur when the economy turns down and doubts about loan quality 
lead to a withdrawal from markets and the freezing out of marginal participants. Such liquidity 
issues can most readily be addressed simply by ensuring a substantial liquidity cushion and 
matching funding sources to cash flow needs.  This approach has already been introduced in 
New Zealand (Reserve Bank of New Zealand 2009). More realistic stress tests that take 
account of the freezing of markets will help in determining the necessary level of preparedness. 
Leverage ratios will also tend to limit procyclicality. 
A further concern relates to accounting methods. The use of fair value accounting can be highly 
procyclical if values are derived from impaired markets when the economy turns down. Not only 
does there tend to be overvaluation in the more euphoric phase, but also artificially low 
valuation in the downturn. It would be highly retrograde to return to the use of historical values 
or other systems that ignore market realities, and valuation methods that operate through the 
cycle (e.g., those using models) make far more sense. However, accounting rules themselves 
tend to make it more difficult to introduce provisioning in excess of what is known based on 
historical values (incurred losses) (Fernández de Lis and Garcia-Herrero 2010). 
Regulation of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) 
The global financial crisis showed that the collapse of systemically important financial 
institutions can have major ripple effects throughout the entire financial system, both as a result 
of their size and their interconnectedness via their transactions with other firms. Moreover, the 
inability to resolve such institutions required very costly bail-outs, which exacerbated the moral 
hazard issue resulting from such institutions being perceived as “too-big-too-fail.” The Basel 3 
reform process has taken a multi-pronged approach to this issue, including: higher capital 
requirements; suggestions for bail-ins via debt that is convertible to equity; a “capital charge” 
assessed on assets; and the establishment of credible resolution schemes for SIFIs, including 
global SIFIs (GSIFIs) (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2010). 
Regulation of innovative financial products and specific investor groups 
The Asian region has not rushed to adopt the sorts of derivative instruments, such as CDOs and 
credit default swaps, that caused such difficulties in the US when there was doubt about the 
value of the underlying loans (Fujii 2010). There are, therefore, few immediate concerns over 
how they should be handled as the later stages of the crisis unfold (Morgan 2009). However, 
many of these instruments are valuable means of hedging and spreading risk, and their 
adoption in the region, once the present crisis is over, will help in the deepening of markets and 
the management of risk. Therefore, the need for such products and the implications for their 
regulation, along with other potentially destabilizing market actions that help to hedge and 
spread risks, needs to be considered. 
For example, mortgage-backed securities have formed a stable source of housing finance in 
Australia for nearly thirty years.  Loan portfolios are all of a high quality and have not strayed 
into the subprime area or moved off balance sheet. Other countries that have stayed with the 
less exotic and more transparent asset-backed securities have also enjoyed stable markets. In 
reaction to the crisis, there has been a rethink to ensure that, in future, the aspects of 
securitization that have led to instability are offset. In the first place, the concern is that all of 
those involved should retain proportionate exposure until the principal underlying the security 
has been paid back. In the past, many of those involved have collected their fees up front and 
have had no exposure to any subsequent deterioration in quality. Thus, agents, originators and 
rating agencies, for example, should receive their remuneration according to the performance of 
their portfolios (Joint Shadow Financial Regulatory Committees 2009). This will help all parties 
to ensure the quality of the assets. In 2009 the US proposed that originators and sponsors be ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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required to retain an economic interest in a “material” portion of the credit risk of securitized 
credit exposures’ and that ‘compensation of market participants’ should be aligned ‘with longer 
term performance of underlying loans’ (US Treasury 2009: 13). This would go a long way to 
achieving the required outcome, especially in combination with the standardization of many 
products. Asian countries could, for example, agree on common features for mortgage-backed 
securities (Fujii 2010). 
The anomalous treatment of asset-backed securities under the Basel regime and associated 
accounting procedures that encouraged banks to move such assets off their balance sheets 
should be ended. While some agents were able to collect their remuneration up front, many 
banks discovered that reputation risk meant that they were exposed to losses in the special 
investment vehicles they had set up to take mortgage-backed securities off their balance 
sheets.  A concentration by financial markets on standardized products would make these 
products more transparent and easier to price. Indeed, they could become more readily traded 
on exchanges and gain stability from the existence of central counterparties. Hence, if these 
straightforward measures are taken, mortgage-backed securities could be developed to 
advantage across the region, assisting in the financing of standardized loans and reducing 
borrowers’ dependence on banks without introducing any unwelcome instability into financial 
markets. 
Authorities around the world have had concerns about the potentially destabilizing effects of the 
speculative activities of investor groups such as hedge funds. Their concerns have stemmed 
from two issues: first, that such organizations are largely unregulated and little is known about 
them, and second, that they might present significant risks to financial stability. However, as the 
crisis has developed, it has become clear that hedge funds have presented few systemic 
problems and, indeed, insofar as they have been holding some of the impaired assets that have 
shown major losses, they have in fact had a stabilizing influence as they have been able to 
absorb their losses and have not proven to be a source of contagion to the market as a whole. 
Private equity funds have also been lumped together with hedge funds in this debate, but their 
activities have little or nothing to do with factors that led to the global financial crisis. 
Credit rating agencies have seen their reputations become severely diminished during the crisis. 
Confidence could be increased by greater transparency, but also by the income of rating 
agencies being linked to the performance of the assets they rate. The main rating agencies 
have been somewhat less active  in Asia than might have been expected from the level of 
financial development in Asian countries, and regional rating agencies have only been emerging 
slowly. While this may have resulted in Asia having been less caught up in the misrating of 
securities that has been demonstrated in the present crisis, it also means that Asian financial 
assets have been more difficult to value. Hence, moving forward, Asian countries will want to 
see rating agencies develop, albeit within a new framework of confidence and without the 
conflicts of interest that have arisen from agencies acting both as advisers and raters (Plummer 
2010). 
Management of capital flows 
The inflow of capital played an important role in the continuing development of the Asian region. 
However, open economies are vulnerable to sudden stops and reversals, and need to be able 
to cope with rapid fluctuations in such flows. Such fluctuations can be reflected in prices as well 
as in quantities in an open environment, putting pressure on competitiveness in an upturn and 
leading to rapid depreciations and credit squeezes when the flows reverse. For example, in the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, there was a double mismatch problem in that not only was 
the currency mismatched, but the inflow of funds was mainly short term, despite the fact that it ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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was financing longer-term projects Therefore, the advantages of access to foreign capital must 
be balanced with the greater potential financial instability inherent in such access. 
Many Asian countries have sought to find a middle way through this problem (Mohan and Kapur 
2010) by not abandoning all capital controls, sterilizing much of the capital inflow to avoid it 
generating inflation, adjusting monetary and fiscal policy where feasible, and managing their 
exchange rates so that fluctuations are limited. To some extent, these responses are the 
consequence of trying to ensure competitiveness and rapid export growth. However, the range 
of possible responses is heavily affected by the degree of openness of each country. India, 
which is not particularly open, has been able to manage pressures rather more extensively, 
using reserve requirements, for example. 
There is a question of the optimal sequencing of liberalization such that as much of the benefits 
from deeper capital markets as possible can be obtained without the downside of unwelcome 
fluctuation in competitiveness in industries with narrow margins. In general, foreign direct 
investment is relatively stable and can be liberalized relatively early while loan flows tend to be 
very volatile and should be liberalized last, with portfolio flows in between. In many cases, the 
main competitors to Asian countries are other countries in the region, so the concern is to see 
only limited fluctuations in foreign exchange cross rates.  
A number of Asian and other emerging economies have introduced measures to discourage 
short-term capital flows in an attempt to increase stability without harming the prospects for 
future longer-term investment flows. For countries that have substantially liberalized the capital 
account, market-based controls—such as the Chilean unremunerated reserve requirement 
(URR) imposed on capital inflows—have been the predominant option in recent years.  Brazil 
imposed a tax on fixed-income and equity inflows in October 2009 in response to surges in 
capital inflows and, in the following month, imposed another tax on certain trades to prevent 
circumvention. However, designing and implementing capital inflow controls is not an easy task. 
Administering capital controls requires highly competent country regulatory authorities as they 
must constantly look out for unwanted flows—often disguised—entering through other channels. 
For these economies, returning to the days of draconian capital controls or recreating a system 
of extensive administrative controls is no longer a viable option.  Table 11 shows some recent 
capital control measures adopted in Asia. ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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Table 11: Recent Capital Control Measures in Emerging Asia 
PRC: Closed capital account 
  2002: QFII introduced 
  2006:  QDII limits introduced 
Indonesia  
  2010: One-month holding period on SBIs (central bank notes) 
Korea  
  2010: Limits on FX derivative contracts on domestic banks (50% of capital) and 
foreign banks (250%) 
Taipei,China 
  2009: Prohibited use of time deposits by foreign funds 
  2010: One-week deadline for money to be invested or repatriated 
Thailand 
  2006: Unremunerated reserve requirements (30%) on loans, bonds, mutual funds, 
swaps and non-resident Baht accounts. 
  2010: 15% withholding tax on capital gains and interest income on foreign bonds 
Source: Central bank reports and news reports. 
Evidence on the effectiveness of capital inflow controls is mixed (Kawai and Takagi 2008). 
Country experiences suggest that the best market-based controls can be expected to lengthen 
the maturity of inflows; but they can have little impact on the overall volume. The effectiveness 
of capital control measures tends to weaken over time as agents in the markets find ways to 
circumvent them. At the same time, capital controls can produce adverse effects: they tend to 
increase domestic financing costs, reduce market discipline, lead to inefficient allocations of 
financial capital, distort decision-making at the firm level, and can be difficult and costly to 
enforce.  
Countries with significant capital controls can ease restrictions on capital outflows in a limited 
manner to reduce net capital inflows. Easing restrictions on capital outflows can mitigate the 
upward pressure on exchange rates. This policy has been pursued by a number of East Asian 
economies, like Japan; Korea;  and Taipei,China during earlier periods of large balance of 
payments surpluses. It has been adopted by the PRC and India in recent years. It must be kept 
in mind, however, that a more liberal capital outflow policy could invite more capital inflows. 
A recent note by  the IMF  (IMF 2011) takes a cautious approach toward capital controls. It 
essentially sees them as a last resort once other policy measures such as tightening fiscal 
policy, easing monetary policy, and eliminating currency under-valuation have already been 
implemented. This partly reflects the findings of Schadler (2008), among others, that fiscal 
policy tightening can help to offset the inflationary consequences of large-scale capital inflows. 
However, in light of the volatility and disruptiveness of capital inflows during recent crises, 
doubts remain about whether it makes sense to assume they are permanent and accommodate 
them by other macroeconomic policy adjustments. Instead, a more pro-active and mixed 
approach is probably prudent. 
Relation to monetary policy framework 
Conventional wisdom on monetary policy in recent years concluded that central banks should 
focus on keeping inflation low and stable, leading to the widespread adoption of inflation-
targeting regimes by central banks. Even many central banks that did not explicitly adopt such 
targets behaved as if they had done so in practice. However, the experience of the global 
financial crisis suggests that this led to an inadequate consideration of financial instability risks. 
In particular, the much-hailed Great Moderation of inflation rates in many economies masked ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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the buildup of financial risk. In particular, backward-looking analyses of risk during this benign 
period led to overconfidence about the risks of leveraging and dependence on wholesale 
finance. Therefore, a number of commentators have suggested that central banks should 
include financial stability in their mandate in addition to price stability. Genberg and Filardo 
(2010) note that there are many problems with such an approach. Certainly a mechanistic 
approach of targeting financial market levels is not feasible or appropriate. Nonetheless, it is 
clear that financial instability is not consistent with price stability in the longer-term, so central 
banks must increase their monitoring of such risks. 
6.  DEEPENING FINANCIAL INTEGRATION  
6.1  Role of financial integration and cooperation 
Deepening financial integration is seen as a key way to support the process of economic growth 
and development. To be sure, some countries pursued achieved high growth rates financed 
mainly by domestic savings, notably Japan, while financial openness increases risks of 
instability associated with volatile capital flows and empirical support for the benefits of financial 
integration is still modest. Nonetheless, access to global capital markets is seen generally as 
worth the risks, given that sufficient institutional safeguards are in place. Countries with 
shallower and less mature financial systems are less prepared for such openness, and need to 
take a staged approach, opening up foreign direct investment first, and only afterward 
graduating to portfolio and loan flows. 
Beyond general integration with global financial markets, there are further benefits from regional 
financial integration steps. ADB’s Asia 2050 study (ADB 2011b) identifies financial integration 
and stability as key areas for cooperation along with trade and transport policy, macroeconomic 
coordination, and access to natural  resources. First, the small size of some Asian markets 
discourages foreign investment. Studies such as ADB (2010) have shown that transactions 
costs are closely related to market size and liquidity, and high costs and small transactions 
costs can deter investors. Second, Asia’s large pool of savings could better be mobilized to 
finance its high needs for investment in infrastructure and other areas. Third, cooperation in the 
area of financial stability can reduce systemic risks in more efficient ways. Europe provides the 
main model for the benefits of financial integration, although recent experience shows the risks 
entailed by closer integration as well. 
6.2  Current state of regional financial integration 
It is generally acknowledged that financial integration in Asia is still low, especially compared 
with trade integration (e.g., ADB 2011b). It is more difficult to analyze regional financial 
integration as opposed to general financial openness (globalization), which was discussed in 
section 3.1 above. Some results seem the  opposite of what one might expect. Lee (2008) 
examined the levels of portfolio holdings of Asian countries to determine whether there was a 
tendency for Asian countries to hold each other’s financial assets disproportionately. Using data 
from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) 2003, he estimated a gravity 
model of portfolio investment that included regional dummy variables.
4
                                                 
4 Gravity models assume that the main drivers of flows between countries relate to their economic size and proximity. 
If, after taking these and any other unusual features such as a common language into account, a pair shows a larger 
than expected flow, some abnormal level of integration is presumed. 
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controlling for the effect of regional trade integration, intra-Asian holdings were lower than the 
average of what was predicted by the model, and even lower if Hong Kong, China; and 
Singapore, which are regional financial centers, were excluded. Lane (2011) found that 
increases in bilateral trade were associated with increases in portfolio holdings of equities, but 
not long-term bonds. A significant regional effect was also found in the level of portfolio holdings 
of the ASEAN+3 group. 
Nonetheless, Asian cross-holdings of financial assets have been rising over time—an indication 
of increased financial integration, albeit from a relatively low base. Table 12 shows the shares of 
cross-border holdings of total international portfolio assets and liabilities in major world regions. 
In 2006, the share of financial assets (liabilities) held intra-regionally by the 16 Integrating Asia 
(IA) economies
5 was only 9.6% (11.1%). Excluding Japan, this share was much higher at 25.3% 
(16.8%), although this is very much affected by high ratios for Hong Kong, China; and 
Singapore. Although these ratios are not particularly high, especially when Japan is included, 
they have increased significantly since 2001. The share of intra-regional assets (liabilities) within 
IA was only 5.6% (10.1%) in 2001, or 15.0% (13.7%) when Japan is excluded. Although IA is far 
from matching financial integration in the European Union (EU),
  6
Table 12: Intra-Regional Portfolio Investment 
 the intraregional shares of 
international financial assets in IA are higher than those in Latin America, and comparable to 
those in the North American Free Trade Agreement.  
Share of total portfolio investment, % 2001 2006 2001 2006
Integrating Asia (IA)-16 5.6 9.6 10.1 11.1
IA-15 (IA-16 less Japan) 15 25.3 13.7 16.8
ASEAN 11 10.4 11.8 9.4
ASEAN+3 3.1 3.7 5.9 4.3
East Asian Summit 5.7 7.2 9.1 6.9
EU-15 60 61.7 57.1 62.3
MERCOSUR 5.6 4.5 1 1.4
NAFTA 16.2 13.9 11.8 12.8
ASEAN= Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Notes:
ASEAN+3= 10 ASEAN member countries plus People's Republic of China, Japan and Korea
EU= European Union 
MERCOSUR= Mercado Com?n del Sur (Southern Common Market)
NAFTA= North American Free Trade Agreement
Source: Capannelli, Lee, and Petri (2009)
Assets Liabilities
 
Another approach is to estimate the extent to which regional savings can explain investment in 
individual countries, which would point to a mechanism for recycling regional savings and 
smoothing investment and  consumption. Using the framework pioneered by Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980), Kim, Kim, and Park (2011) found evidence that regional savings was significant 
in explaining investment in the region, although most of this effect was attributable to Japan 
rather than ACI countries. 
                                                 
5 The 16 Integrating Asia economies are Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; PRC; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; 
Japan; Korea; Lao People’s Democratic Republic; Malaysia; Myanmar; Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; 
Thailand; and Viet Nam. 
6 The ratio for intra-EU assets (liabilities) holdings was 61.7% (62.3%) in 2006. ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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A number of studies have also found increased correlations of stock market indices and interest 
rate movements across the region, including Bae (2011), Hinojales and Park (2011) and Park 
and Lee (2011). Bae (2011) found that the average global integration of stock markets for all 
Asian sample economies was 23%; the average regional integration was 34%, reflecting the 
combined effects of global and regional factors; but purely regional integration (excluding global 
factors) was only 15%, and did not show a rising trend over time. Therefore, globalization rather 
than regionalization still seems to be the main factor explaining more synchronized stock market 
performance. Consistent with other measures of financial openness, Singapore and Hong Kong, 
China had the highest measures of purely regional integration, while the PRC, Thailand, and 
India had the lowest measures. Hinojales and Park (2011) also found greater evidence of global 
integration than regional integration among emerging East Asian equity markets. On the other 
hand, Park and Lee (2011) found that East Asian local currency bond markets tend to be 
segmented, being neither regionally nor globally integrated. 
6.3  Measures to deepen integration 
Measures to deepen financial integration have made the most progress within ASEAN, mainly 
as part of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) project. Key issues for the PRC and India 
include further opening of their capital accounts and convertibility of their currencies. 
ASEAN Economic Community Project Timetable 
Among the ACI economies, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) project provides the 
template for more extensive regional financial integration. The AEC project is summarized in the 
AEC blueprint, ratified by ASEAN members in 2007 (ASEAN Secretariat 2007). The ambitious 
target of the AEC is to achieve the ASEAN Economic Community by 2015 as a region with free 
movement of goods, services, investment, skilled labor, and “freer” flow of capital. The broad 
aim of the project is both to enjoy the scale economies of a unified market and to reduce the 
development gap among its member countries. To be sure, the blueprint recognizes in practice 
that some countries will progress faster than others, and liberalization will be done on a 
voluntary basis, which it characterizes as the “ASEAN minus X” formula. Regarding the financial 
services sector, the blueprint aims for a first round of liberalization by 2015, with other 
subsectors or modes being liberalized by 2020 (ASEAN Secretariat 2007). 
In order to strengthen ASEAN capital market development and integration, the blueprint calls for 
the following actions: 
“i. Achieve greater harmonization in capital market standards in ASEAN in the areas of offering 
rules for debt securities, disclosure requirements, and distribution rules; 
ii. Facilitate mutual recognition arrangement or agreement for the cross recognition of 
qualification and education and experience of market professionals; 
iii. Achieve greater flexibility in language and governing law requirements for securities 
issuance; 
iv. Enhance withholding tax structure, where possible, to promote the broadening of investor 
base in ASEAN debt issuance; and 
v. Facilitate market driven efforts to establish exchange and debt market linkages, including 
cross-border capital raising activities.” (ASEAN Secretariat 2007:17) 
It further notes that the liberalization of capital movements is to be guided by the 
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“a) Ensuring an orderly capital account liberalization consistent with member countries’ national 
agenda and readiness of the economy; 
b) Allowing adequate safeguard against potential macroeconomic instability and systemic risk 
that may arise from the liberalization process, including the right to adopt necessary measures 
to ensure macroeconomic stability; and 
c) Ensuring the benefits of liberalization to be shared by all ASEAN countries.” (ASEAN 
Secretariat 2007:17) 
Capital flow liberalization 
Liberalization of capital accounts in the PRC and India, together with convertibility of the yuan 
and the rupee are key developments for promoting regional financial integration. However, as 
was discussed above, capital accounts in the PRC and India are still relatively closed. For 
example, Table 13 below shows the current status of capital account openness in the PRC, 
according to IMF classifications. Foreign direct investment is essentially liberalized, but portfolio, 
loan, and derivative transactions are still heavily controlled, including quotas on both inward and 
outward portfolio flows. ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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Table 13: Summary—The PRC’s Current Capital Controls 
Market  Investor group Inflows  Outflows 
Money 
market 
Non-residents  No permission  No permission 
Residents  Prior approval by the PBC 
and SAFE is required 
No permission for residents, 
except authorized entities 
Stock 
market 
Non-residents  B shares and QFII  Sell B shares, repatriate  
QFII 
Residents  Sell H (or N or S) share 




Non-residents  QFII  No permission, except for 
some international finance 
entity, repatriate QFII 
Residents  Prior approval by the PBC 
and the SAFE is required. 
Bonds issued abroad must 
be incorporated into the 
State external debt plan. 
No permission for residents, 




Non-residents  No permission  No permission 
Residents  Operations in such 
instruments by financial 
institutions are subject to 
prior review of 
qualifications and to limits 
on open foreign exchange 
position. 
Operations in such 
instruments by financial 
institutions are subject to 
prior review of qualifications 
and to limits on open foreign 
exchange position. 
 
Source: IMF (2008).  
To be sure, the PRC has undertaken a number of steps to ease restrictions on capital flows as 
part of its program to internationalize the yuan. Some of these steps are summarized in Table 
14 below. These have been aimed primarily at bank deposits, yuan-denominated bond 
issuance, including by non-residents, and bond funds. So far, the liberalization of offshore use 
of the yuan in capital account transactions has taken place only in Hong Kong, China as a test 
case. A key development will be to extend this liberalization to other overseas markets. Another 
key step will be to end the quotas on inward and outward portfolio flows. ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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Table 14: Recent PRC Capital Account Liberalization Measures 
2004  HK banks can offer RMB deposits 
2005  Foreign multilateral banks can issue RMB bonds in PRC ("Panda bond") 
2007  Mainland financial institutions can issue RMB bonds in HK ("Dim sum bond") 
2008  Mainland financial institutions can issue RMB bonds in HK 
2009  Mainland subsidiaries of HK banks can issue RMB bonds in HK 
    Mainland sovereign issued RMB bonds in HK 
    RMB insurance products allowed in HK 
2010  RMB inter-bank market opened to selected offshore RMB holders 
    Foreign firms can issue RMB bonds in HK and PRC 
    Foreign firms can borrow (loans) in HK 
    RMB structured deposits allowed in HK 
    RMB bond funds allowed in HK 
Source: HSBC (2010), HSBC (2011). 
India, on the other hand, has tight controls on FDI but looser controls on portfolio flows. For 
example, although India has a system for registering qualified  foreign institutional investors 
(FIIs) similar to that of the PRC’s QFII system, in India there are no overall quotas on portfolio 
inflows by such investors. Table 15 summarizes the current status of capital account regulation 
in India. ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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Table 15: Summary—India’s Current Capital Controls 
Market  Investor group Inflows  Outflows 
Foreign direct 
investment 
Non-residents  Can acquire up to 100% stake, subject to 
various sectoral and other restrictions 
Foreign corporates can 
repatriate benefits after 
taxes 




Non-residents  Deposit limits for NRIs  Time limits and penalties 
for early withdrawal 
Residents  Banks allowed to 
lend and borrow 
freely, under limits. 
No permission for 
individuals; limits on 
banks  
Stock market Non-residents  FII registration or participatory note (no 
limits); FIPB and RBI approval needed for 
large stakes; ownership limits 
Repatriate  FII 
Residents  Allowed without ceiling; but restrictions on 
use domestically; ECBs can be converted 
to equity 
No limits for individuals; 
limits on banks 
Bonds and 
other debts 
Non-residents  FII registration or participatory note (no 
limits); strict limits on size by issuer 
category 
Repatriate FII 
Residents  Allowed within limits (ECB: up to US$500 
million per year for corporates, with other 
restrictions, too); tighter limits on banks; 
short-term borrowing highly restricted 
No limits for individuals; 




Non-residents  FII registration; subject to various limits; 
currency futures not allowed 
Repatriate FII 
Residents  Forward contracts allowed to cover export 
and import exposures. 
Forward contracts 
allowed to cover export 
and import exposures. 
 
Source: Authors, based on Kohli and Belaisch (2011).  ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
 
 
  33 
Harmonization of regulation and taxation 
As noted above (see Table 8), investors report issues related to regulation (including foreign 
exchange regulation) to be among the most pervasive barriers to cross-border investment. Their 
perception of barriers differs sharply across different national bond markets.  Therefore, a move 
to harmonize tax rules and regulations in the direction of the more liberalized markets could 
bring substantial benefits in terms of transaction volumes. Of course, a number of the barriers 
refer more to trade practices rather than taxes or regulations, so those need to be tackled 
separately. Again, the ASEAN AEC provides a good model to start from. As discussed below, 
an Asian Financial Stability Dialogue could provide a good forum for standardizing tax rules and 
financial regulations. 
ACU-denominated bond market 
For many Asian countries, increases in bond market size as a share of GDP are unlikely to be 
sufficient to obtain the scale economies necessary to achieve the cost reductions that are 
adequate to successfully compete with offshore bond markets. Instead, the achievement of 
adequate scale economies is likely to require cooperation at the regional level. Their best 
prospect may be some kind of regional currency basket that would mitigate the currency 
exposure of issuers, although not eliminate it entirely (Spiegel 2010). The Asian Currency Unit 
(ACU) is one major candidate for such a common basket. This would also have the advantage 
of popularizing the use of the ACU, which could encourage its use in other kinds of transactions 
as well. The example of European bond markets is instructive. Hale and Spiegel (2009) found 
that subsequent to the launch of economic and monetary union in Europe, there was a 35.3% 
increase in the probability of issuing in euro relative to pre-union national currencies among 
nonfinancial firms in international bond markets. Even before the adoption of the euro, the 
development of the European Currency Unit led to a rapid expansion of European Currency 
Unit-denominated bond issues in Europe. The adoption of an Asian currency unit might result in 
a similar increase in issuance within the region. 
Regional settlement institutions  
Cross-border portfolio investment could be encouraged by the development of regional stock 
and  bond exchanges. Cross-listing of stocks should be encouraged as well. International 
securities transactions, especially those within the region, could also be encouraged by 
development of a regional settlement institution along the lines of those existing in Europe. 
Development of regional financial centers 
The further development of regional financial centers can also contribute to regional growth, and 
should be supported by policy measures. By 2030, in addition to Hong Kong, China;  and 
Singapore, Mumbai and Shanghai are expected to emerge as important regional financial 
centers. However, this development hinges crucially on the liberalization of international capital 
flows in India and the PRC, respectively, plus a host of corresponding domestic reforms to 
strengthen the financial system and harmonize financial regulations and tax rules. Those 
countries should develop a more transparent timetable for such a transition. 
There does not appear to be a universally accepted definition of the term “international financial 
center” (IFC). Nor is there a unique framework of quantitative measures that would document 
their activities and relative performance. Some recent studies of the factors governing the 
development international financial centers, with a focus on Asia, include Cheung and Yeung 
(2007) and Leung and Unteroberdoerster (2008).  
Of course, a country may have large financial markets simply as a result of having a large 
domestic economy. The distinguishing characteristic of an international financial center is the ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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importance of international financial activities in overall business, including the presence of 
international financial institutions, high levels of cross-border flows, wealth management 
services and, perhaps most importantly, high levels of exports  of financial services. Such 
centers must achieve a high degree of efficiency in order to attract business from other markets. 
Leung and Unteroberdoerster (2008:11) argue that “…the exports of financial services provide a 
comprehensive measure of all international financial activities carried out in an economy.” They 
further  argue that inward foreign direct investment in the financial sector also provides a 
measure of the attractiveness of the financial sector in that country, although it does not 
necessarily distinguish between attractions of the domestic financial market and the role as an 
international financial center.  
In their empirical work, Leung and Unteroberdoester (2008) find that both macroeconomic and 
microeconomic/institutional factors as well as financial market strength and efficiency are 
important in the formation of IFCs. In terms of attracting international financial institutions, the 
fact that both Hong Kong, China;  and Singapore have been outperforming the regional 
economies and many other major economies, including Japan, in this regard, appears to be 
explained, in part, by their favorable microeconomic/institutional environment. The latter may be 
described by survey indices of competitiveness, such as those published in Xinhua-Dow Jones 
(2011), World Economic Forum (WEF) (2011) and Z/Yen Group (2011), which are summarized 
in Table 16 below.  
Table 16: Competitiveness/Development Scores of Major Financial Centers 
    GFCI  Xinhua-DJ  WEF*   
London  1  2  2   
New York  2  1  1   
Hong Kong, China  3  4  3   
Singapore  4  5  4   
Shanghai  =5  6  22   
Tokyo  =5  3  9   
Chicago  7  11  1   
Zurich  8  12  8   
Frankfurt  14  8  13   
Shenzhen  15  21  22   
Seoul  16  24  24   
Mumbai  58  34  37   
         
Source: Z/Yen Group (2011), Xinhua-Dow Jones (2011), WEF (2011). 
* Ratings for countries rather than cities.     
Most of the top rankings are not very surprising or variable: New York, London, Hong Kong, 
China; and Singapore, followed by Tokyo. However, the rankings of Shanghai are much more 
variable, quite high in the GFCI and Xinhua-Dow Jones surveys, but much lower in the WEF, 
reflecting strikingly different assessments of the business and institutional environment.   
Mumbai generally ranks quite low, although, as described below, this may be somewhat 
misleading. 
As mentioned above, exports of financial services (including insurance) should be a good 
indicator of development as an international financial center. Usually, one would normalize this 
measure by using its ratio to GDP. However, this can be misleading because of much different 
degrees of openness across economies, e.g., Hong Kong, China; and Singapore are very open, ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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while the US, PRC and India are less so. The ratio of exports of financial services to total 
service exports may give a better comparison. Figure 1 below shows a scatter plot of this figure 
versus the level of per capital GDP. 
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Note: PRC = People’s Republic of China; HKG = Hong Kong, China; IND = India; INO = Indonesia; JPN = Japan; KOR = Korea; 
MAL = Malaysia, PHI = Philippines; SIN = Singapore; THA = Thailand; TAP = Taipei,China; UK = United Kingdom; and US = United 
States. 
Source: CEIC Database Co. 
Figure 3 shows that the level of economic development is an important predictor of the level of 
financial service exports, but there is still substantial variation. The United Kingdom (UK) is a 
huge outlier, and the levels for Hong Kong, China; the US; and India are above the trend line, 
while there is a big gap with almost all other Asian economies, including the PRC, which are 
below the trend line. Other things being equal, the trend line suggests that, if per capital GDP in 
the PRC triples over the next twenty years to around $12,000, the share of financial services 
exports would rise to around 7%, still only about half of the current level of Singapore. More 
rapid progress would require other reforms. 
In their regression equations using financial service exports to the US as the dependent 
variable, Leung and Unteroberdoerster (2008) find that language, measures of economic 
freedom, and the number of listed foreign companies are significant determinants of such 
exports. It also seems likely that capital market openness, the legal system and the tax system 
are important determinants as well. Figure 4 shows that there is a strong correlation between 
capital market openness and financial service exports, and the major international financial 
centers all have very high Chinn-Ito scores of 2.48. There is a clear gap between those 
economies and the other Asian economies. ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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Source: CEIC Database Co. and Aizenman, Chinn and Ito (2008). 
As noted above, both India and the PRC score low on the Chinn-Ito index at -1.15. However, 
the varying composition of capital controls in each country may explain the differing 
performance in terms of financial service exports. The PRC has essentially no restrictions on 
foreign direct investment, but tight controls on portfolio and loan investment, including quota 
limits for foreign institutional investors. India on the other hand has tight controls on FDI but 
looser controls on portfolio flows. Therefore, the Chinn-Ito index probably underestimates the 
openness of India with regard to non-FDI capital flows. 
The acid test for the development of Shanghai and Mumbai as regional financial centers is full 
convertibility of the yuan and rupee, respectively, together with substantial liberalization of the 
capital account to allow largely unfettered capital flows. Along with this, standards of regulation, 
governance, tax and legal systems will have to be brought up to developed country status. 
Finally, macroeconomic management and regulation and management of domestic financial 
sectors will have to be strengthened to a point where they can cope with liberalized capital 
flows. This lack of financial development is after all the main reason why the PRC and India 
have been reluctant to open their capital accounts fully, as is emphasized in discussions of the 
development of Mumbai such as in HPEC (2007). This also suggests that these two countries 
have a long road to travel to achieve this goal. ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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6.4  Mobilizing regional savings 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Fund 
Although some Asian countries have made large investments in improving their infrastructures, 
others still lag behind. While these investments have improved national facilities, Asian 
countries will only be well connected when there are good cross-border infrastructures in place 
as well. As mentioned above, Asia’s infrastructure investment needs are massive, and current 
funding sources are likely to be inadequate. Abidin (2010) proposed an East Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Fund (EAIIF) to provide a mechanism to organize this funding and to 
be a platform for deciding on cross-border infrastructure projects. The EAIIF would be anchored 
to the existing Association of Southeast Asian Nations+3 mechanism with the leader’s summit 
being the apex of the decision making process. However, it will be quite desirable to extend this 
fund to cover South Asia as well, so henceforth we will refer to it as the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Fund (AIIF).
7
The AIIF would be an independent legal entity that is a non-profit institution. It would raise and 
lend funds for cross-border infrastructure projects and would be owned by Asian economies, 
multilateral institutions, and the private sector. Besides its capital, it would raise additional funds 
from the public sector, development agencies, and the private sector. The purpose of the fund 
would be to fill the gap between projects that receive cheap funding (through development aid) 
and those that have to pay their full costs (entirely financed by the private sector at commercial 
rates). Projects chosen for funding could be those with a high rate of commercial returns or 
those with the highest social benefits. The AIIF would invite the private sector to participate by 
setting a framework for the sharing of risks between the public and private sectors. Likewise, 
there would also be a sharing of risks between countries. The private sector could either invest 
directly into the EAIIF or the funding could be raised through the Asian Bond Fund (ABF). 
Another possible source of funding is the Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI), which was 
endorsed by the finance ministers of ASEAN+3 (Abidin 2010).  
 
The AIIF could be a platform for countries to coordinate their national infrastructure 
developments that could ultimately be linked to form regional networks. In this way, 
governments would still have the responsibility and oversight of their national infrastructure 
projects while meeting the larger regional goals. The proposal to pool Asian financial resources 
does not preempt the existing bilateral efforts to fund regional infrastructure projects such as the 
Japanese ODA or the US$10 billion PRC–ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund. Infrastructure 
projects financed by development aids are still necessary because they provide financing at 
very reasonable costs to the least developed countries (Abidin 2010). 
Enhancements to ABMI, ABF, CGIF 
Further development of Asian bond markets (through the Asian Bond Markets Initiative and the 
Asian Bond Funds) could provide important support to countries seeking to increase investment 
for growth, whether for infrastructure or other types of private investment. ASEAN+3 countries 
(ASEAN plus the PRC, Japan,  and Korea) should accelerate the process of establishing a 
Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility (CGIF) to provide credit guarantees for bond issuance 
in regional currencies. These efforts are being extended to markets for equities and derivatives 
as well, under the rubric of the Asian Capital Markets Initiative (ACMI). 
                                                 
7 It is expected that ASEAN will launch its ASEAN Infrastructure Fund in September of this year, with a funding 
amount of US$450 to $480 million (Jakarta Post 2011). ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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6.5  Measures to improve regional financial stability  
Regional monitoring and surveillance: Asian Financial Stability Dialogue 
One of the most important steps in regional cooperation is better information and analysis, to 
understand the extent of the financial interdependencies in the Asian region, and to assess the 
challenges these pose and how they can best be addressed. Europe has one key advantage 
over Asia in this regard. At the outset, in 1956, the European Community set up a central 
organization, the European Commission, whose task it is to promote the process of integration. 
Other institutions have since been added, including, most notably, the European Central Bank. 
Corresponding Asian institutions, insofar as they exist, are small and have little power by 
comparison. Hence, to make substantial progress in improving regional financial stability, there 
needs to be a suitable driving force. Plummer (2010) and others support the idea of an Asian 
Financial Stability Dialogue (AFSD), which was first suggested in Kuroda (2008). This entity 
could build on existing institutions in the region, including the Economic Review and Policy 
Dialogue (ERPD) and the Executives’ Meeting of Asia-Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP). The 
body should include the participation of finance ministries, central banks, and financial market 
regulators and supervisors. 
In the early stages, such an arrangement could focus on issues that would help advance the 
areas of common interest that have already been identified and that are largely being dealt with 
under separate initiatives, such as the management of volatile short-term capital flows. Plummer 
(2010) sees it initially focusing on improving early warning systems, being able to assist in 
negotiations on common exchange rate changes, and, perhaps, helping in crisis management. 
This is akin to the open method of coordination in the EU, whereby countries agree that certain 
common objectives should be targets for the medium term. It is each country’s choice how far to 
go in implementing any of the agreement, but the role of the secretariat (the European 
Commission in the EU case) is to monitor progress and publish the results. When countries see 
themselves, in effect, in some form of league table, it may put peer pressure upon them. The 
problem with this arrangement is that it is easy for countries to implement measures that enable 
them to claim that they have undertaken the necessary actions, but it is quite difficult to see to 
what extent these actions are working in practice and whether the desired changes have really 
taken effect. 
The principal question is how far an AFSD might proceed beyond simply monitoring, diagnosing 
potential threats and suggesting remedies. One of the problems revealed in the run-up to the 
present crisis is that some organizations, particularly the Bank for International Settlements, did 
diagnose various sources of fragility, but they had no powers to act upon them. The 
establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations +3  Macroeconomic Research 
Office in Singapore in 2011 is an important step in this direction. 
While an AFSD as outlined by Kuroda (2008) would not be aimed at the sorts of closer 
harmonization of financial markets and tools in member countries as developed in Europe and 
accelerated under the Lamfalussy process, Hsu and Liao (2010) suggest this is exactly the road 
it should take, with matching committees of Asian banking supervisors, Asian securities and 
futures supervisors, and Asian insurance and pension supervisors. They see these committees 
as identifying areas where common regulatory arrangements would be helpful. However, while 
they might be able to develop such recommendations, it will still be up to the individual countries 
to implement such change. 
 
Plummer (2010) argues that an AFSD could play an important role in developing best practice 
for securities markets in the region and in encouraging the development of regional markets. ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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This would not merely make it easier for investors to address a number of markets, but would 
deepen the markets so that a yield curve over the range of maturities could develop. This would 
be a marked improvement over the rather fragmented present framework. 
The structure of the proposed AFSD relates closely to the objectives of the Financial Stability 
Board at the global level. Its predecessor, the Financial Stability Forum, promoted the 
observance of standards and codes. An AFSD can thus be seen as a first step toward achieving 
greater financial stability in the region. It makes more sense to have an organization with a 
limited mandate that makes successful progress than to try to leap immediately to closer 
cooperation without the necessary political and popular support. 
EMEAP has been playing an increasing role in helping Asian countries work together in recent 
years. While it may be overambitious to suggest that this might develop into an Asian Bank for 
International Settlements (Plummer 2010), it nevertheless presents a possible organizational 
basis for increasing cooperation. As yet, the organization does not have a developed 
secretariat, although participating central banks service its subcommittees and working groups. 
In some respects, the problem for Asia is that there are quite a number of different forums for 
cooperation, comprising different groupings of countries, rather than one with a major focus that 
has the resources and mandate to make a major impact. 
Financial Safety Net: Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization 
Following dissatisfaction with the role played by the IMF during the Asian financial crisis of 
1997–1998, a regional cooperative financing arrangement to supplement IMF resources was 
agreed in May 2000 at the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ Meeting in Chiang Mai, which is 
referred to as the “Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI)”. It initially took the form of bilateral swap 
agreements, but in May 2007 the region agreed to convert the bilateral schemes of the CMI into 
a multilateralized self-managed reserves pooling scheme governed by a single contractual 
agreement, or the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM). The size of the agreement 
was increased to $120 billion, and the amount of the allocation that would be withdrawn without 
triggering an IMF program was increased from 10% to 20% (so-called “IMF conditionality” or 
“IMF linkage”) (Sussangkarn 2010). 
Finally, the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) was established in May 2011 
to provide surveillance capability within the region. This ultimately has the aim of ending the 
need for relying on IMF conditionality, which has proved a stumbling block to members’ 
willingness to use the CMIM up until now. Because of the experiences of various Asian 
economies with IMF programs during the Asian crisis, most Asian countries find it politically 
unacceptable to seek assistance from the IMF unless all other options are exhausted. For 
example, during the global financial crisis, Korea sought help from the US Federal Reserve and 
Indonesia from the Bank of Japan and the People’s Bank of China, rather than resorting to the 
CMI. Therefore, eliminating IMF conditionality is a necessary step to making the CMIM a 
functional financial safety net within Asia’s regional financial architecture.  
The CMIM needs other improvements as well to make it effective. First, the CMIM borrowing 
quota may not be enough if a country gets into serious problems. To address this issue, CMIM 
funds should be increased further, and it should be made possible for CMIM funds to be 
supplemented with additional contributions from countries in the group. Second, instead of just 
borrowing from the CMIM, countries should also be able to arrange swap facilities with the 
CMIM, in a similar manner as with central bank swaps. Third, new instruments, such as a 
precautionary credit facility for a near-crisis situation should be introduced. Fourth, it should be 
possible for other members of the East Asian summit not part of the ASEAN+3 (Australia, India, 
and New Zealand) to participate in CMIM activities. Finally, the AMRO needs to have sufficient 
resources and staffing to support the capabilities of an Asian monetary fund (Sussangkarn ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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2010). Fulfillment of these improvements should enable the CMIM to become a full-fledged 
Asian monetary fund. 
Relation with international financial institutions 
International economic and financial decision-making has been invigorated by the shift to the 
G20 as the premier international forum, thereby including the voices of emerging economies as 
well as those of advanced economies. However, effective global economic governance will also 
require changes in key global organizations—such as the International Monetary Fund, World 
Bank, World Trade Organization, and the Financial Stability Board—and closer collaboration 
between global and regional organizations. Kawai and Petri (2010) argue in favor of introducing 
federalism on a global scale by creating hierarchies of global and regional organizations with 
overlapping ownership structures in various functional areas (as is already the case with the 
World Bank and regional development banks in the area of development finance). If Asia 
manages to build effective institutions to promote macroeconomic and financial stability and 
deepen financial integration, as described in the previous section, this can provide a good 
precedent for the federalism process. 
Decentralization could be achieved through independent organizations linked together—and 
perhaps to a “senior” global organization—by rules and procedures. An example of such rules, 
albeit little used so far, is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XXIV, 
which establishes relationships between regional trade agreements and the global trading 
system. This solution would create linked hierarchies of global and regional organizations with 
different ownership structures. This framework is illustrated in Table 17 for the three functional 
areas—macroeconomic stability, development finance,  and  financial system stability. The 
applications to each area are described below. 
Table 17: Institutional Families in Global and Asian Economic Governance 
Function  Global Institutions  Asian Examples 
Macroeconomic  IMF  Asian Monetary Fund 
Stability  Surveillance, crisis lending,  (to evolve from CMIM) 
  systemic stability  Regional surveillance, crisis lending, 
        stability 
Development  World Bank  Asian Development Bank 
finance  Global public goods: poverty,  Regional development priorities, 
    environment, food and energy  regional infrastructure lending 
Financial system  Financial Stability Board  Asian Financial Stability Dialogue 
stability  Global standards, colleges of  (to be created) 
    regulators  Asia’s regulatory initiatives 
Source: Adapted from Kawai, Petri, and Sisli-Ciamarra (2010). 
In the area of macroeconomic stability, regional organizations—alongside the IMF—could act as 
"first responders" in the case of regional threats. This could avert the criticism that the IMF 
reacts too slowly because it represents the interests of countries outside the region, and it could 
better internalize spillovers among closely-linked economies. Also, experience shows that the 
financial requirements of a full-blown crisis can be very large, and that no one institution is likely 
to have sufficient funds to contain a crisis.   
In the area of development finance, regional development banks already exist alongside the 
World Bank, and the next step is to improve the division of labor between regional and global ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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organizations. Ideally, the World Bank, should focus on global objectives and externalities, such 
as the Millennium Development Goals, climate change, food and energy security, and 
epidemics. In contrast, regional development banks should focus on regional issues and 
externalities, such as regional infrastructure connectivity and regional environmental protection. 
In the area of financial system stability, the global financial crisis has highlighted the need for an 
international framework for monitoring, regulating and supervising the cross-border activities of 
systemically important financial firms, products and transactions. The FSB has been tasked with 
establishing such a framework and coordinating the authorities charged with implementing it. In 
collaboration with the IMF, it is also charged with providing early warning of macroeconomic and 
financial risks and proposing actions to remedy them. As described above, a similar structure 
should also be developed in Asia. This would parallel the structure of the AFSD described 
above. The AFSD could play a valuable role by translating FSB initiatives into a regional context 
and then helping to implement them. 
Improve FX policy management and coordination 
Although some exchange rate flexibility is desirable, a pure floating system is probably not a 
practical option for most East Asian emerging economies, given the potential for excessive 
volatility and misalignment, and the possibly adverse impacts on trade and investment. Since 
many economies are competitors to each other, some exchange rate stability is desirable to 
prevent an unnecessary reallocation of resources that may be reversed within a short period of 
time. Asia needs a type of regional framework for exchange rate stabilization, which promotes 
intraregional exchange rate stability while retaining sufficient flexibility against external 
currencies. 
Kawai and Takagi (2011) propose a staged process for increasing Asian currency coordination. 
At least initially, the operation of a regional exchange rate policy coordination mechanism in 
Asia should be less formal and more flexible than the European Monetary System (EMS) of 
1979–98, given the current lack of commitment to full-fledged regional monetary union, the 
greater diversity in the level of economic and financial development across the region, and the 
dynamic nature of East Asian economies with rapid growth, evolving economic structures, and 
possibly differing inflationary tendencies. These features make it likely that the East Asian 
economies face very different economic shocks and imbalances in certain circumstances, thus 
necessitating nominal exchange rate adjustment from time to time. There should be a 
presumption that the economies adjust the reference rates with respect to the basket differently 
over the medium term. 
The first step for concrete exchange rate policy coordination is to introduce an informal process 
to achieve both greater exchange rate flexibility vis-à-vis the US dollar and some exchange rate 
stability within East Asia. This can be done by using a common or a similar basket of SDR-plus 
currencies (the US dollar, the euro, the British pound, the yen,  and emerging East Asian 
currencies) as a loose reference.  Under this scheme, those economies under US dollar pegs 
will increase exchange rate flexibility; all emerging East Asian economies will essentially adopt a 
managed float targeted at an SDR-plus currency basket—as is currently practiced by 
Singapore. During this phase, the AMRO could play a secretariat role to manage the pooled 
resources and to negotiate a program of economic policies with a country seeking financial 
support in the event of a crisis, in addition to providing significant inputs to the ERPD process. 
To give teeth to the process of policy dialogue and surveillance, there must be agreement on 
the choice of analytical tools to use in monitoring economic developments and addressing policy 
spillovers across economies in the region. The most important indicator to agree on is an 
indicator of exchange rate misalignment. The least politically challenging way to devise such an 
indicator is to calculate a separate effective exchange rate index for each economy and monitor ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
 
 
  42 
how the value of each currency is changing in effective terms. The purpose of such an indicator, 
at least initially, is to help identify the reason why the effective exchange rate index for a 
particular currency is moving in a particular direction. Once there is agreement on the choice of 
weights, a currency basket—called the Asian currency unit (ACU)—could be used as a 
divergence indicator of the type used in the EMS (Takagi 1989).   
The second step is the joint adoption of a formal policy of stabilizing intraregional exchange 
rates using a common basket of SDR-plus currencies (i.e., the US dollar, the euro, the pound, 
and the ACU) as a reference. The basket stabilization policy would have to be well defined with 
respect to how the central rates should be defended. The authorities would allow greater 
exchange rate flexibility vis-à-vis the US dollar while enjoying a lesser degree of national 
monetary policy autonomy. The ACU index should continue to serve as an important indicator in 
measuring the joint movements and divergences of East Asian currencies, and its use in the 
financial markets should be encouraged. The AMRO—or any full-fledged CMIM-ERPD 
secretariat that may succeed it—would then be transformed into a more structured Asian 
monetary fund (AMF). India’s participation in the AMF would be an important further 
development. 
The third step would be to launch more systematic exchange rate and monetary policy 
coordination to create a regional monetary anchor. Here, two approaches are possible—the 
“European” approach and the “parallel currency” approach (Eichengreen  2006). Under the 
“European” approach, a common basket peg similar to the snake or exchange rate mechanism 
(ERM) could be introduced. All currencies will become freely flexible vis-à-vis external 
currencies, such as the US dollar and the euro, but maintain intraregional stability through the 
joint stabilization of individual currencies with respect to the ACU. The mechanism should 
include clearly-defined, transparent monetary policy and intervention rules so as to provide a 
credible monetary anchor within East Asia as well as a fully elaborated short-term liquidity 
support arrangement, which is large and speedy enough for frequent interventions in the 
region’s currency markets. The AMCF will become the clearing house of frequent interventions 
as well as the issuer of official ACUs. Fiscal policy rules may also be designed to lend credibility 
to the exchange rate stabilization scheme. A practical approach is to take a multi-track, multi-
speed approach, whereby economies ready for deeper policy coordination begin the formal 
process of policy coordination while others prepare to join later. 
7.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
By 2030, many ACI economies are expected to achieve developed economy status, and the 
financial sector must contribute substantially to support this development. The financial sector is 
a critical part of the infrastructure to support high and sustainable growth in the ACI region over 
the next two decades. This section summarizes our policy recommendations at the national, 
sub-regional and regional levels. 
First, ACI financial markets must increase their depth, sophistication, and reach in terms of 
financial inclusion in order to support an economy with much higher wealth but also high 
demands for investment. This includes investment in “public goods” areas such as 
infrastructure, health, education,  and green growth where the private financing mechanism 
cannot be relied on to generate sufficient investment without policy intervention. Adequate 
financial infrastructure in terms of derivatives markets, credit rating agencies, and government 
debt management needs to be introduced. Systems for clearing and settlement also need to be 
upgraded. Table 18 shows where action is needed by individual countries in these areas. ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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Table 18: Action Areas for Financial Deepening and Efficiency 
PRC IND INO MAL PHI SIN THA VIE
Deepening
  Infrastructure for Securities and FX Markets
    Repo operations X X X X X
    Securities lending X
    Local currency borrowing X X X X X X X
    FX settlement X X
    FX restrictions X X X X X X X
    Income payments X
    Jurisdiction issues X X
    Taxes X X X X X
    Registration X X X X X X
    Access to local settlement X X X X
    Omnibus accounts X X X
  Support for Infrastructure Financing
    Strengthen PPP infrastructure X X X X
  Government Debt Management
    Improve supply management X X X X X
Efficiency
  Payments, Clearance and Settlement
    Introduce RTGS X
    Upgrade RTGS X X X X X X X
  Competition Policy
    Liberalize foreign entry X X X X X X X
Note: PRC = People's Republic of China; IND = India; INO = Indonesia; MAL = Malaysia; PHI = Philipp
THA = Thailand; and VIE = Viet Nam.
Source: Authors.  
Increasing financial inclusion is a key aspect of achieving sustainable growth and improving 
income distribution. This includes finance for consumers, MSMEs, micro-finance and green 
finance. Table 19 shows areas for further action by individual countries in this area. ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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Table 19: Action Areas for Financial Inclusion 
PRC IND INO MAL PHI SIN THA VIE
Increase access
  Consumer finance X X X X X X X
  MSME finance X X X X X X X
  Micro-finance X X X X X X X
  Green finance X X X X X X X X
Improve data systems
  Credit guarantee system X X X X X X
  Credit data X X X X X X X
Legal and regulatory infrastructure
  Consumer protection X X X X X X X
  Micro-finance regulation X X X X X X X X
Note: PRC = People's Republic of China; IND = India; INO = Indonesia; MAL = Malaysia; PHI = Philip
THA = Thailand; and VIE = Viet Nam.
Source: Authors.  
At the same time, ACI economies must take steps to enhance financial stability, including 
upgrading their microprudential supervision frameworks in line with the Basel 3 rules and 
improving regulatory capacity. They also should review their monetary and macroprudential 
policy frameworks for supervision, management of procyclicality and management of crises, and 
strengthen them if needed. A framework for management of volatile capital flows should be 
seen as an integral part of macroprudential management. Regulatory frameworks also must be 
extended to support inclusive financing while at the same time maintaining financial stability. 
Table 20 summarizes areas for action in this area for individual countries. 
Table 20: Action Areas for Financial Stability 
PRC IND INO MAL PHI SIN THA VIE
Microprudential
  Strengthen capacity X X X X X X X
  Close regulatory gaps X X X X X X X
  Implement Basel III X X X X X X X X
Macroprudential - Domestic
  Strengthen monetary policy framewo X X X X X X
  Structure for surveillance X X X X X
  Macroprudential tools
  Structure for crisis management X X X X X
Macroprudential - Capital flows
  Capital account liberalization X X X X X X X
  Capital flow management tools X X X X X X
Note: PRC = People's Republic of China; IND = India; INO = Indonesia; MAL = Malaysia; PHI = Phi
THA = Thailand; and VIE = Viet Nam.
Source: Authors.  
In these areas, steps taken at the national level will be necessary but not sufficient, so will need 
to be supplemented by regional cooperation measures. Many ACI markets are too small to 
generate sufficient scale economies to lower transaction costs to attractive levels. High and 
inconsistent levels of regulation of foreign exchange and other transactions, taxation, settlement 
procedures, etc., discourage foreign investors and keep markets too small. This points to the 
need for harmonization of regulations and tax policies within the region, as well as potentially 
the development of an ACU-denominated bond market. The achievement of the ASEAN AEC 
program is the logical starting point and model for this. An Asian Financial Stability Dialogue can 
provide a forum for deciding on harmonization measures. Some countries also lack adequate ADBI Working Paper 345    Morgan and Lamberte 
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fiscal resources for needed  public investment. The development of an Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Fund and further enhancements of the ABMI (including the extension to ACMI) and 
ABFs could help to recycle high levels of Asian savings within the region to support investment 
for infrastructure and other uses. Finally, steps to achieve full convertibility of the yuan and the 
rupee, together with the development of Shanghai and Mumbai as regional financial centers, 
can help promote regional financial integration. Actions recommended in this area, both at the 
level of ASEAN and ACI, are shown in Table 21. 
Table 21: Action Areas for Financial Integration 
ASEAN Asia Global
Deepening and efficiency
  Harmonization of financial markets
    Regulation AEC AEC as model
    Taxation AEC AEC as model
    Capital account liberalization AEC AEC as model
    ACU bond market X
  Efficiency
    Develop regional financial centers
Mumbai,
Shanghai
    Regional clearing & settlement institutio X X
  Mobilizing savings
    Extend ABMI and ABF X X
    Asia Infrastructure Investment Fund X X
Financial stability
    Regional monitoring and surveillance AMRO, AFSD
Coordination
with IMF, FSB




  Use ACU as reference X X
  Gradual increased coordination X X  
Source: Authors 
To promote financial stability and support macroeconomic and financial policy coordination, 
including greater exchange rate coordination, the region’s economies must make greater efforts 
to strengthen regional financial cooperation—the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralized (CMIM) 
and Economic Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD). Once the region puts in place the CMIM 
with sufficient capacity to conduct regional economic surveillance and to formulate independent 
adjustment policy, its lending operations can be delinked from IMF programs. Only then will the 
facility establish itself as an independent regional monetary fund and financial safety net. The 
recent creation of the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) is an important step 
in this direction. Much work remains, however, in strengthening collaboration between the 
region’s finance ministers and central bank governors as well as harmonization among the 
region’s financial sector supervisors and capital market regulators. Along with establishing these 
regional institutions, it will also be necessary to define their role vis-à-vis their corresponding 
international financial institutions. Finally, increased use of the ACU as a reference can play a 
part in a gradual program of increased currency coordination within the region. 
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